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E V I L  
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In Book  IV Sp inoza  says a n u m b e r  of  th ings  a b o u t  the  
k n o w l e d g e  of  g o o d  a n d  evil that  a p p e a r  to be s ign i f ican t  
for  his a r g u m e n t  as a whole ,  but: which are  by no m e a n s  all 
as c lear  a n d  dis t inct  as they shou ld  be. T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  this 
essay is to e x a m i n e  these  a n d  ce r ta in  r e l a t ed  passages  in 
o r d e r  to say s o m e t h i n g  m o r e  abou t  Sp inoza ' s  me ta -e th i c s  
than  is said by C. D. B r o a d  a n d  o thers ,  in the  h o p e  that  
this will be of  in t r ins ic  interest  to s tuden t s  of  Sp inoza ,  of  
C o n t i n e n t a l  Ra t iona l i sm,  a n d  p e r h a p s  even  of  meta-e th ics ,  
bes ides  be ing  of  use in u n d e r s t a n d i n g  and  assessing 
Sp inoza ' s  view as a whole .  It will t h e r e f o r e  deal  with those  
passages only insofa r  as they th row light on his rec ta-e th ics ,  
i.e. o n  his  v i ews  aho t l t  j n d g m e n t s  of  valt le  It will, 
l l l ( ) re()vel ,  he  c ( ) [ I cc l l l ed  only with ihe rec ta -e th ics  of  
ju({gtI'tel~-,ts <>f g o o d  a n d  evi l ,  not  will'] tl'lat o [  j u d g m e n t s  of  
v i r tue  a n d  vice, which nlay he S()lllewha[ d i f f e ren t .  ~ T o  
s impl i fy  ma t t e r s  I shall f r e q . e n t l y  talk only about  the  
k n o w l e d g e  o f  g o o d  (K(;)  r a t h e r  than at>otlt the  k n o w l e d g e  
of  g o o d  a n d  evil (K( ;E) ,  a s s u m i n g  that what is said a h o u t  
K(;  will also apply ,  mutatis mutm~dis, to the  k n o w l e d g e  of 
evil (KE), which is t r u e  except  for o n e  point  to he dealt  
with separa te ly  in Sectio~l VII .  
T h e r e  are  t h r e e  ma in  rcst)ccts in which Sp inoza ' s  meIa-  
ethics  of  g o o d  and  evil is a m h i g u o ~ s  a n d  unc lea r .  (I)  H e  is 
ostensihly a natura l is t  in ( ; .E.  M o o r e ' s  sense,  o r  at least a 
Sl>mOza's dcfinilions of virtue and vice are a bit diflerent from those of 
good aud e'dl. I believe, however, that he would say much the same 
things aboul the knowledge of virtue and vice that he does about KGE. 
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def in is t ,  fo r  he  expl ici t ly  gives de f in i t ions  of  g o o d  a n d  evil 
( s o m e w h a t  d i f f e r e n t  ones  in d i f f e r e n t  places) that  play a 
crucia l  role  in his p roo f s  of  s o m e  of  his own  eva lua t i ve  
j u d g m e n t s ,  as B r o a d  poin ts  ou t  a n d  as I a s s u m e d  in an 
ea r l i e r  p a p e r  on Sp inoza ' s  m e t a - e t h i c s :  T h i s  sugges t s  that  
h e  wou ld  say: 
a. that  j u d g i n g  x to be  g o o d  = j u d g i n g  tha t  x has DP 
(a ce r t a in  d e f i n i n g  p rope r ty ) ,  
b. that  k n o w i n g  x to be g o o d  = k n o w i n g  that  x has 
DP. 
H o w e v e r ,  this is not  what  he  actual ly  says w h e n  he  tells us 
wha t  KG is, as we shall see. W h a t  he  does  say sounds ,  on 
the  face of it, not  only l ike h e d o n i s m ,  bu t  also m o r e  l ike 
e m o t i v i s m  than  like na tu ra l i sm.  H e  also says o t h e r  th ings  
that  go m o r e  na tu ra l ly  with e m o t i v i s m  than  with na tu ra l -  
ism. (2) Usual ly ,  Sp inoza ' s  de f in i t ions  of  g o o d  a n d  evil a re  
not  hedonis t i c ,  but ,  as we shall also see, t h e r e  is o n e  in 
which  he  seems  to bui ld  h e d o n i s m  in to  the  very  m e a n i n g  of  
" g o o d "  and  "evil" .  (3) H e  seems  in s o m e  places to ho ld  that  
we j u d g e  th ings  to be  g o o d  because  we des i r e  t h e m ,  not  
vice versa,  a n d  in o the r s  thai  we des i r e  t h e m  because  we 
j u d g e  t h e m  to be good .  T h e s e  t h r e e  p r o b l e m s  will be 
t o u c h e d  on in d u e  cou r se  a n d  o t h e r  unc la r i t i e s  a n d  
p r o b l e m s  will t u rn  up  as we go  a long .  
O n e  migh t  beg in  lhis rev iew of Sp inoza ' s  m e t a - e t h i c s  with 
a d iscuss ion o f  his de f in i l i ons  of  g o o d  a n d  evil,  but I h a v e  
said s o m e t h i n g  about  t h e m  in t he  p r e v i o u s  p a p e r  r e f e r r e d  
to a n d  wish h e r e  to focus  on wha~ Sp inoza  says a b o u t  KGE,  
r e f e r r i n g  to his  de f in i t i ons  only as they b e c o m e  r e l evan t .  I 
shall  t h e r e f o r e  p r o c e e d  by s t a r t ing  with his mos t  i m p o r t a n t  
prop<)sition a b o u t  K(;E,  b r i n g i n g  in e a r l i e r  a n d  la ter  
passages  that  bea r  on it, a n d  then  g o i n g  on to look at s o m e  
(but  not  all) o f  the  o t h e r  th ings  he  says a b o u t  KGE.  
See C.D. Broad, Five 7"ype.~ o[ Ethical Theory, New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and ('o., 1930, pp. 257, 259; W.K Frankena, "Spinoza's 'New 
Morality'," in Spino/a, ed. by E. Freeman and M. Mandelbaum, I.a 
Sallc, II1.: Open Court, 1975, pp. 61-84. 
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T h e  p r o p o s i t i o n  r e f e r r e d  to  is P8 ,  I V :  
K n o w l e d g e  o f  g o o d  a n d  evi l  is n o t h i n g  b u t  a n  a f f e c t  o f  
j oy  o r  s o r r o w  i n s o f a r  as  w e  a r e  c o n s c i o u s  o f  it. s 
H e r e  w e  m a y  r e a d  " p l e a s u r e "  f o r  " j o y "  a n d  " p a i n "  f o r  
" s o r r o w " .  A s  was  i n d i c a t e d ,  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  is b o t h  m o r e  
e m o t i v i s t i c  a n d  m o r e  h e d o n i s t i c ,  o n  i ts  f a c e  a t  l eas t ,  t h a n  
o n e  w o u l d  e x p e c t ,  g i v e n  m o s t  o f  S p i n o z a ' s  d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  
g o o d .  F o r ,  g i v e n  t h o s e  d e f i n i t i o n s ,  o n e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  h i m  to  
say  t h a t  K G  s i m p l y  is t h e  k n o w l e d g e  t h a t  s o m e t h i n g  is 
u s e f u l  to  us ,  o r  c o n t r i b u t e s  to  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  o u r  
b e i n g ,  o r  i n c r e a s e s  o u r  p e r f e c t i o n ,  o r  is a m e a n s  b y  w h i c h  
we  m a y  c o m e  n e a r e r  to  t h e  m o d e l  o f  h u m a n  n a t u r e  w e  se t  
b e f o r e  u s  - -  d e p e n d i n g  o n  w h i c h  d e f i n i t i o n  o n e  p icks .  H a d  
h e  s a i d  th i s ,  a n d  o n l y  th i s ,  h i s  v i ew  w o u l d  b e  c l e a r l y  
n a t u r a l i s t i c  a n d  it w o u l d  l e a v e  o p e n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  
p l e a s u r e  is t h e  g o o d ?  A c t u a l l y ,  h o w e v e r ,  P8  s e e m s  to  a s s e r t  
s o m e t h i n g  m o r e  l ike  o n e  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  v iews :  
a. K G  = h a v i n g  j o y  ( o r  p l e a s u r e ) .  
b. J u d g i n g  x to  b e  g o o d  = h a v i n g  a n  e m o t i o n  o f  j o y  
a b o u t  x. 
(a) w o u l d  b e  g l a d l y  a g r e e d  to  by  a h e d o n i s t  a n d  (b)  by  a n  
e m o t i v i s t .  
T h r e e  q u e s t i o n s  a r i s e .  (1) J u s t  w h a t  d o e s  PS, I V ,  say?  T o  
a n s w e r  t h i s  we  m u s t  t ry  t o  s e e  w h a t  S p i n o z a  h a d  in  m i n d ,  
p a r t l y  by  l o o k i n g  a t  h i s  p r o o f ,  p a r t l y  b y  l o o k i n g  a t  t h i n g s  h e  
s ays  e a r l i e r ,  a n d  p a r t l y  b y  l o o k i n g  a t  w h a t  h e  g o e s  o n  to  
say.  (2)  H o w  d o e s  h i s  p r o o f  go ,  a n d  d o e s  it e s t a b l i s h  w h a t  
:~ Here and elsewhere I quote from W.H. White's translation. 
" Of course, he would he a naturalist only if the concepts used in his 
definitions can themselves he analyzed in naturalistic terms. Here I use 
"naturalist" for anyone who defines ethical concepts wholly in non- 
normative terms. I should note, however, that G.E. Moore took Spinoza 
to be a "metaphysical" definist, not a naturalistic one. I leave open the 
question whether he is right about this. See Principia Ethica, Cambridge 
University Press, 1929, pp. l l0 ,  113. The  assertion Moore cites as 
making Spinoza a metaphysical definist is not actually one of Spinoza's 
definitions proper. 
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P8, thus  i n t e r p r e t e d ,  asserts? (3) Why  does he b r i n g  P8 in 
at all? Why  does  he not  s imply say that  K G E = k n o w i n g  
w h e t h e r  th ings  c o n t r i b u t e  to the p r e se rva t i on  of o u r  b e i n g  
(etc.) or  not?  
Since we mus t  use Spinoza ' s  p roo f  in a n s w e r i n g  any  of 
these ques t ions ,  we mus t  have it be fo re  us. I shall no t  quo te  
it, however ,  bu t  res ta te  it in a series of n u m b e r e d  
s t a t emen t s  as follows, wr i t ing  in the  de f in i t ions  a n d  p ropos -  
i t ions Sp inoza  refers  t o :  
1. We  call a t h ing  good which con t r i bu t e s  to the  p rese rva-  
t ion of o u r  be ing .  Defs. 1, IV. 
2. T h e  effort  by which each th ing  e n d e a v o r s  to pe r seve re  
in its own be ing  is n o t h i n g  bu t  the actual  essence  of the 
t h ing  itself. P7, I I I .  
3. T h e r e f o r e ,  we call a t h ing  good which increases  or  helps  
o u r  power  of act ing.  
4. Joy is the passion by which the m i n d  passes to a g r e a t e r  
per fec t ion .  Def. of joy, Schol. PII ,  I l l .  
5. T h e r e f o r e ,  we call a t h ing  g o o d  in so far  as we perce ive  
that  it affects us with joy. 
6. T h e  m i n d  not  only perceives  the  affect ions of the body  
bu t  also the ideas of ahese affections.  P22, I I. 
7. T h e r e f o r e ,  KG is n o t h i n g  but  the idea of joy that  
necessari ly a ccompan ie s  the affect of joy itself. 
8. T h i s  idea [of joy] is u n i t e d  to the affect [of joy] in | he  
same  way that  the m i n d  is u n i t e d  to the  body .  P21, I1. 
9. T h e r e f o r e ,  this idea is not really dist inct  f r o m  the  affect 
itself. Schol. P21, II.  
10. An  affect is an affection of the  body  by which its pow e r  
of act ing is inc reased  or  d i m i n i s h e d ,  h e l p e d  or  h i n d e r e d ,  
t oge the r  with the idea of this affect ion of the  body.  Def. 3, 
I I I .  
11. T h e r e f o r e ,  the idea of joy [ r e f e r r ed  to in 7, 8, a n d  9] is 
not  really dis t inct  f rom the idea of the affect ion of the  
body,  bu t  only  concep tua l ly  so. 
12. T h e r e f o r e ,  K(;, is n o t h i n g  bu t  the affect of joy itself in 
so far as we are consc ious  of it. 
Fil led ou t  in this way, the  p roo f  gives us m u c h  of what  we 
n e e d  to answer  o u r  ques t ions .  
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It is obvious  that  P8 is m a k i n g  some k i n d  of equ iva l ence  
or  ident i ty  claim. Just  what  is it c l a iming  to be ident ica l  with 
what? A n d  what  k i n d  of iden t i ty  is it c l a iming  to ob t a in  
be tween  them? 
(a) As was observed ,  P8 does  no t  say that  KG = k n o w i n g  
that  x con t r i bu t e s  to the  p r e s e r v a t i o n  of o u r  be ing ,  which  is 
what  one  would  expect  a na tu ra l i s t  to say who accepts the  
de f in i t ion  of good  used  he re  by Spinoza .  T h e r e  is no  
reason  to bel ieve that  Sp inoza  would  no t  accept  this 
equa t ion ;  he  would ,  in fact, be incons i s t en t  if he  d id  not .  
Bu t  this is no t  the e q u a t i o n  he is c o n c e r n e d  to assert  
explicitly. T h e  e q u a t i o n  he asserts in P8 is this: KG = 
h a v i n g  an affect of joy a n d  b e i n g  conscious  of h a v i n g  it. 
But  KG is r a t h e r  m o r e  a m b i g u o u s  t h a n  Sp inoza  recognizes ,  
a n d  so we are  not  yet sure  jus t  what is be ing  ident i f ied  with 
hav ing  an affect of  joy a n d  be ing  consc ious  of it (or m o r e  
simply,  with b e i n g  consc ious  of h a v i n g  joy). T h e  p h r a s e  
" the  k n o w l e d g e  of good  a n d  evil" may re fe r  to any  of the  
fol lowing:  
(1) H a v i n g  concepts  of goodnes s  a n d  badness ,  
(2) Be ing  a c q u a i n t e d  with goodness  a n d  badness ,  
(3) H a v i n g  o p i n i o n  abou t  what  is good  or  evil, 
(4) H a v i n g  t rue  ()pinion abou t  what is good  or  evi;l, 
(5) K n o w i n g  that  s o m e t h i n g  is good  or  bad.  
Prima [acie these are dis t inct ,  a n d  one  may ask which of 
t h e m  Spinoza  m e a n s  to e q u a t e  with be ing  consc ious  of 
h a v i n g  joy. O n e  is t e m p t e d  to say that  (3) a n d  (4) 
p r e s u p p o s e  (1) a n d  that  (I)  p r e s u p p o s e s  (2), a n d  Sp inoza  
migh t  agree ,  t h o u g h  the  la t ter  asser t ion  smacks  of e m p i r i -  
cism r a the r  t han  ra t ional i sm.  It may be ob jec ted  that  
Sp inoza  would  not  h imse l f  d i s t ingu i sh  (!) a n d  (2) f rom (3), 
(4), a n d  (5), a n d  this may be t rue ;  he does th ink  tha t  
h a v i n g  an idea ( image,  concept ,  or  percept )  entai ls  m a k i n g  
a j u d g m e n t .  5 It may also be ob jec ted  that  o n e  shou ld  no t  
pu t  (3) a n d  (4) u n d e r  the  h e a d i n g  of knowledge ,  as I have.  
But  Sp inoza  does that  h imse l f  when  he speaks  of "know-  
ledge  of the first k ind"  a n d  when  he says that  KE is 
See e.g. Ps. 17, 28, 35, 43, 49, II. 
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i n a d e q u a t e  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  I a m  s imply  fo l l owing  his  usage .  
T h u s  my  q u e s t i o n  r e m a i n s .  I be l i eve  S p i n o z a  w o u l d  r e p l y  
tha t  K G E  in all five senses  is " n o t h i n g  bu t "  b e i n g  consc ious  
of  h a v i n g  joy  o r  so r row.  His  p r o o f  m a k e s  it c lear ,  h o w e v e r ,  
tha t  he  has  (3), (4), o r  (5) p r i m a r i l y  in m i n d ,  s ince  it c e n t e r s  
on  wha t  we call  o r  j u d g e  to be  g o o d .  T h u s ,  h e  m e a n s  to  
insist ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y ,  tha t  the  " k n o w l e d g e "  tha t  x is g o o d  
(which may  be  on ly  o p i n i o n )  = b e i n g  c o n s c i o u s  tha t  x 
affects  o n e  with joy.  
(b) As  fo r  t he  n a t u r e  of  t he  e q u a t i o n  o r  i d e n t i t y  c l a i m e d  
in P8, it is c l ea r  t ha t  it is no t  c o n c e p t u a l  i den t i t y .  S p i n o z a  is 
no t  a s s e r t i n g  a n y t h i n g  tha t  is t r u e  s imp ly  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  as 
he  w o u l d  be  if h e  were  to say tha t  K G  = k n o w i n g  tha t  x 
c o n t r i b u t e s  to t he  p r e s e r v a t i o n  of  o n e ' s  be ing .  R a t h e r ,  t he  
e q u a t i o n  a s s e r t e d  in P8 is o n e  tha t  r e q u i r e s  a p r o o f  u s i n g  
no t  on ly  de f in i t i ons ,  bu t  also s o m e  p r o p o s i t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
e a r l i e r  on  the  basis  of  a x i o m s  as well as d e f i n i t i o n s .  S p i n o z a  
is a s s e r t i n g  an  i den t i t y  tha t  is necessa r i ly ,  no t  jus t  c o n t i n g -  
en t ly ,  t rue ,  b u t  no t  o n e  tha t  is t r u e  by d e f i n i t i o n  a lone .  
W e  m u s t  r e m e m b e r  in this  c o n n e c t i o n  tha t  S p i n o z a  h o l d s  
tha t  m i n d  a n d  b o d y  have  p rec i se ly  the  k i n d  o f  i d e n t i t y  jus t  
d e s c r i b e d .  T h e y  a r e  the  s a m e  in s u b s t a n c e  b u t  d i f f e r  in 
a t t r i b u t e  o r  c o n c e p t u a l l y .  In  fact ,  S p i n o z a  be l i eves  tha t  
t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  th ings :  
( i )  an af fec t ion  of  my b o d y  by which  its p o w e r  o f  a c t i n g  
is i n c r e a s e d ,  
(2) an affect  of  joy  in my  m i n d ,  which  is an  i d e a  o r  
p e r c e p t i o n  of  tha t  a f fec t ion  of  my b o d y ,  a n d  
(3) an i dea  o r  p e r c e p t i o n  of  tha t  affect  of  joy  in my 
m i n d .  
H e  also be l ieves  tha t  these  t h r e e  t h i n g s  a r e  subs t an t i a l l y  t h e  
s a m e  a n d  d i f f e r  on ly  c o n c e p t u a l l y ;  by P21, I I ,  (1) is u n i t e d  
to (2) a n d  (2) is u n i t e d  to (3) as t he  m i n d  is u n i t e d  to t h e  
b o d y .  But ,  now,  in P8, IV,  he  is a s s e r t i n g  tha t  K G  is 
" n o t h i n g  bu t "  (3) a n d  it is still no t  c l ea r  w h a t  k i n d  of  
i den t i t y  he  m e a n s  to a sc r ibe  to  t h e m .  If ,  as I be l ieve ,  he  is 
no t  c l a i m i n g  t h e m  to be  c o n c e p t u a l l y  o r  d e f i n i t i o n a l l y  
iden t i ca l ,  t h e n  he  mus t  h o l d  tha t  K G  is c o n c e p t u a l l y  a 
f o u r t h  t h i n g  bes ides  (1), (2), a n d  (3), a n d  tha t  it is " u n i t e d  
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to" (3) a n d  is " n o t h i n g  bu t "  (3) in the  same way in which 
the  m i n d  is " u n i t e d  to" or  " n o t h i n g  bu t "  the body.  I do  no t  
t h ink  Sp inoza  sees that  he  mus t  ho ld  this, bu t  it follows 
f r o m  the  fact that  he  de f ines  the  good  as what  is c o n d u c i v e  
to the  p r e se rva t i on  of one ' s  be ing .  For,  on  this de f in i t i on ,  
k n o w i n g  the  good  is strictly ident ica l  with k n o w i n g  what  is 
c o n d u c i v e  to the  p r e s e r v a t i o n  of one ' s  b e i n g  a n d  can be 
only  synthet ical ly  ident ica l  with h a v i n g  an  affect of joy of 
which o n e  is conscious.  O n  an  o lde r  view of ma thema t i c s ,  
which Sp inoza  would  have shared ,  2 + 2 a n d  2 x 2 were  
synthet ical ly  a n d  necessar i ly  e q u i v a l e n t  or ident ical ,  a n d  it 
seems to me  that  in P8 he mus t  be  m a i n t a i n i n g  that  KG 
a n d  (3) are e q u i v a l e n t  o r  ident ica l  in a s imi lar  way. 
I I  
Does Sp inoza ' s  d e m o n s t r a t i o n ,  as s tated,  actual ly sqaow 
that  the  e q u a t i o n  or  iden t i ty  asser ted  in P8 is t rue?  L o o k i n g  
back at his p r o o f  as r e f o r m u l a t e d  ear l ie r ,  I a m  no t  su re  
that  it does.  In  the  first place, (1) is no t  es tab l i shed  by the  
d e f i n i t i o n  cited, as it is s ta ted by Spinoza .  T h e  de f in i t i on  
reads,  "By good,  I u n d e r s t a n d  that  which we cer ta in ly  
know is use fu l  to us. ''~ But  f r o m  this, even  if we equa t e  
be ing  use fu l  with b e i n g  c o n d u c i v e  to o u r  se l f -p rese rva t ion  
(or per fec t ion) ,  it does no t  follow that  we call a t h i ng  good  
which is c o n d u c i v e  to o u r  se l f -p rese rva t ion  (or per fec t ion) .  
T o  ob t a in  this c o n s e q u e n c e  Sp inoza  wou ld  have ha d  to say, 
"By good,  we u n d e r s t a n d  that  which . . . .  " where  the  "we" 
is no t  jus t  edi tor ia l  bu t  refers  to all of us, a n d  it is d o u b t f u l  
that  he t h o u g h t  we all do  m e a n  this by good.  7 Secondly ,  I 
do  no t  see at all clearly how (2) gets us f r o m  (1) to (3) or  
even  jus t  how (5) follows f r o m  what  precedes .  T h i r d l y ,  the  
crucial  s tep is (7), a n d  it is no t  obv ious  that  (7) follows f r o m  
(5) a n d  (6), especially s ince (7) c o n t a i n s  a t e rm,  KG, which 
does  no t  a p p e a r  in (5) or  (6). (5) m u s t  m e a n  e i the r  of the  
fo l lowing:  
Def. I, Bk. IV. 
7 See e.g. what he says about "good" in Appendix, Bk. I. 
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5a.  W e  cal l  x g o o d  if  we  h a v e  a n  a f f e c t  o f  joy  in  
c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  it, i.e. a n  i d e a  o r  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  a n  a f f e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  b o d y  by  w h i c h  its p o w e r  o f  a c t i n g  is i n c r e a s e d ,  o r  
5b .  W e  cal l  x g o o d  if  we  h a v e  a n  i d e a  o r  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  
a n  a f f e c t  o f  j o y  in  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  it, i.e. a n  i d e a  o r  
p e r c e p t i o n  o f  a n  i d e a  o r  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  a n  a f f e c t i o n  o f  t h e  
b o d y  b y  w h i c h  . . . 
B u t  ( 6 ) o n l y  te l ls  u s  t h a t ,  w h e n  o u r  b o d y  h a s  a n  a f f e c t i o n  o f  
t h i s  k i n d ,  t h e n  w e  h a v e  n o t  o n l y  a n  a f f e c t  o f  j oy  b u t  a n  i d e a  
o f  t h a t  a f fec t ,  a n d  h o w ,  g i v e n  t h i s  a n d  e i t h e r  (5a)  o r  (5b)  
c a n  w e  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  K G  is n o t h i n g  b u t  t h i s  i d e a ?  S p i n o z a  
m u s t  b e  a s s u m i n g  t w o  f u r t h e r  u n s t a t e d  p r e m i s e s :  
13. I f  we  ca l l  x g o o d  i n s o f a r  as  w e  p e r c e i v e  t h a t  i t  a f f e c t s  
u s  w i t h  joy ,  t h e n  calling x g o o d  is n o t h i n g  b u t  p e r c e i v i n g  
t h a t  it a f f e c t s  u s  w i t h  joy .  
14. I f  c a l l i n g . x  g o o d  is n o t h i n g  b u t  p e r c e i v i n g  t h a t  it 
a f f e c t s  u s  w i t h  j oy ,  t h e n  knowing x to  b e  g o o d  is n o t h i n g  h u t  
a n  i d e a  o f  j oy  w h i c h  n e c e s s a r i l y  a c c o m p a n i e s  a n  a f f e c t  o f  
joy .  
N o  d o u b t ,  o n e  c a n  a f f i r m  s o m e  k i n d  o f  e q u a t i o n ,  if  t h e  
a n t e c e d e n t s  o f  (13)  a n d  (14)  a r e  t r u e ,  h u t  t h e r e  a r e  a 
n u m b e r  o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  h e r e ,  a n d  it is n o t  c l e a r  o n e  c a n  
a s s e r t  t h e  e q u a t i o n  in I '8.  
H o w e v e r  t h i s  m a y  be,  o n e  w o n d e r s  w h y  S p i n o z a  d i d  n o t  
s i m p l y  a r g u e  as fo l lows ,  if h e  m e a n t  to  s t a r t  f r o m  h i s  ba s i c  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  g o o d :  
m.  x is g o o d  = x is c o n d u c i v e  to  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  
o n e ' s  h e i n g .  By d e f .  
n .  T h e r e f o r e  j u d g i n g  x is g o o d  = j u d g i n g  x to  b e  
c o n d u c i v e  to  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n .  
o. A n d  K G  = k n o w i n g  t h a t  x is c o n d u c i v e  to  se l f -  
p r e s e r v a t i o n .  
p. X is c o n d u c i v e  to  o n e ' s  s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n  = x i n c r e a s e s  
o n e ' s  p o w e r  o f  a c t i n g  = x a f f e c t s  o n e  w i t h  joy .  
q. T h e r e f o r e  j u d g i n g  t h a t  x is g o o d  = j u d g i n g  t h a t  x 
a f f e c t s  o n e  w i t h  joy .  
r. A n d  K G  = k n o w i n g  t h a t  x a f f e c t s  o n e  w i t h  joy .  
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So stated,  his p roo f  wou ld  c o m p o r t  with his p rev ious  theory  
a n d  it would  establish P8 if that  p rev ious  theory  is t rue .  
III 
However ,  the  m a i n  ques t ion  for  us is no t  w h e t h e r  
Sp inoza  proves  P8 b u t  what  he  has in  m i n d  in asse r t ing  it. 
A b o u t  this we can b e c o m e  c learer  if we cons ide r  P8 in 
a n o t h e r  perspect ive ,  also p r o v i d e d  by Spinoza .  I m e n t i o n e d  
ear l ie r  that  it seems to say s o m e t h i n g  like what  a h e d o n i s t  
wants  to say, viz. that  k n o w i n g  x to be good  = f i n d i n g  it 
p leasant ,  be ing  affected by it with p leasure ,  etc. For  
Spinoza ,  however ,  this is the  conc lus ion  of a longish  
a r g u m e n t  b e g i n n i n g  with a n o n - h e d o n i s t i c  de f in i t ion  of 
good  a n d  i n c l u d i n g  a r a t h e r  d i f f e ren t  concep t ion  of 
p l easu re  f r o m  that  which is usual  a m o n g  hedonis t s .  T h e  
good he def ines  as what  is c o n d u c i v e  to the  p re se rva t ion  of 
o u r  be ing ,  to an  increase  in o u r  pe r fec t ion ,  etc. Joy or  
p leasure  he def ines  in several  re la ted  bu t  somewha t  differ- 
en t  ways: 
(a) It is the passion by which the m i n d  passes to a g r e a t e r  
per fec t ion .  
(b) It is a m a n ' s  passage f rom a lesser to a g r e a t e r  
per fec t ion .  
(c) It is an affection by which the body ' s  power  of act ion 
is increased .  
(d) It is an affection of the  body  by which its power  of 
act ion is increased ,  t oge the r  with the  idea of this affection.  ~ 
B e h i n d  these de f in i t i ons  of p leasure  or  joy is the t h o u g h t  
that  what  is basic is an  affect ion of the  body by which its 
power  of act ing is i nc reased  or  a ided ,  a n d  that  p leasure  or  
joy is e i the r  the idea (pe rcep t ion)  in the  m i n d  of that  
affect ion of the body by which its power  of ac t ing  is 
inc reased  or  a ided,  a n d  that  p leasure  or  joy is e i the r  the  
idea (pe rcep t ion)  in the  m i n d  of that  affection or  a 
c o m b i n a t i o n  of tha t  affect ion with an  idea  of it (actually,  for 




Spinoza ,  the  affect ion a n d  the  idea of it a re  subs tan t ive ly  
ident ica l  t h o u g h  qual i ta t ively d i f fe rent ) .  T h i s  m e a n s  that ,  
on  Sp inoza ' s  view, a joy or  p l ea su re  is o r  i nc ludes  a k ind  of 
p e r c e p t i o n  of good,  s ince it is or  i nc ludes  a p e r c e p t i o n  
(pe rhaps  con fused ,  bu t  possibly clear  a n d  dis t inct) ,  of an  
affect ion of the  body  in which its power  of ac t ing,  etc., a re  
inc reased  or  he lped ,  i.e. it is a k i n d  of k n o w l e d g e  of good.  
It  is or  involves  a cogn i t ion ,  howeve r  c o n f u s e d ,  of a ce r ta in  
fact, a n d  is no t  s imply a b l i nd  feel ing,  as emot ivis ts  a n d  
hedon i s t s  usual ly  conceive  it to be. T h i s  po i n t  is b e h i n d  
what  Sp inoza  says in PS, bu t  it is no t  what  he  says in P8. In  
P8 Sp inoza  ident i f i ies  the k n o w l e d g e  of good ,  no t  with the 
idea or  p e r c e p t i o n  of a modi f i ca t ion  of the  body  ( the affect 
of joy), bu t  with the  h i g h e r  level idea or  p e r c e p t i o n  of tha t  
first level idea or  pe rcep t ion .  But ,  of  course ,  if the  first 
level idea  ( the affect) is a k i n d  of  KG, t h e n  the  s econd  level 
idea will also be k ind  of KG. T h i s  is pa r t  of  what  P8 asserts,  
a n d  it does  follow f r o m  Sp inoza ' s  g e n e r a l  pos i t ion .  T h e n ,  
however ,  he  shou ld  have  said tha t  t he r e  are  in a sense t w o  
k inds  of KG: that  r e p r e s e n t e d  by the  affect of  joy itself a n d  
that  r e p r e s e n t e d  by the consc iousness  of tha t  affect; even  
t h o u g h  these are  in some sense  real ly ident ica l  for h im,  
they are  at least concep tua l ly  dist inct .  P8 does  no t  m a k e  this 
po in t  explicit .  I n d e e d ,  it is a bit m i s l e a d i n g  in sugges t ing  
that  only  the h i g h e r  level idea involves  a cogn i t i on  of good.  
However ,  P8 is not  saying only  that  consc iousness  of an 
affect of joy is a k ind  of KG. It says or  seems to say that  all 
KG is " n o t h i n g  but"  a consc iousness  of an  affect of joy, a n d  
this does  no t  follow f rom the  pos i t ion  jus t  sketched.  I 
bel ieve in fact that  Sp inoza  c a n n o t  really be h o l d i n g ,  as he 
he re  seems to, that  P8 is t r u e  for  all k inds  of KG, a n d  will 
try to exp la in  why as we review o t h e r  passages in which he 
touches  on  o u r  subject .  
Before  look ing  at o the r  passages d e a l i n g  with KGE,  
however ,  let us cons ide r  br ief ly  the t h i rd  ques t i on  raised 
ear l ie r  a b o u t  P8, IV, viz. the  ques t i on  why, in the  only  
place in which he says what  KGE is, he  gives us PS, ins tead  
of saying  that  KG = k n o w i n g  that  s o m e t h i n g  c o n t r i b u t e s  to 
the p r e se rva t i on  (or pe r fec t ion)  of o u r  be ing .  As far  as I 
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can see, Sp inoza ' s  reply wou ld  s imply  be, (a) that  t he re  is 
this f u r t h e r  e q u a t i o n  which can be p roved ,  a n d  (b) tha t  this 
f u r t h e r  e q u a t i o n  is i m p o r t a n t  for  la ter  par ts  of his story. 
T h i s  may be so. It  r e m a i n s  t rue ,  however ,  that ,  logically, 
KG jus t  is basically the  k n o w l e d g e  that  s o m e t h i n g  is 
c o n d u c i v e  to one ' s  se l f -p rese rva t ion  or  pe r fec t ion .  I t  is 
consc iousness  of joy if an  only  if it can be show n  that  the re  
is a sense in which every case of k n o w i n g  x to be  c o n d u c i v e  
to one ' s  se l f -p rese rva t ion  or  pe r f ec t i on  = b e i n g  consc ious  
of joy in c o n n e c t i o n  with x. Bu t  this e q u a t i o n  we shall  f ind  
r ea son  to t h i n k  Sp inoza  c a n n o t  establ ish,  even  on  his own 
terms.  
IV 
Let us now cons ide r  o t h e r  passages in the  o r d e r  of the i r  
a p p e a r a n c e  in the  Ethics. (1) T h e n  we mus t  beg in  with an  
a p p a r e n t  de f in i t i on  of good  - -  the  first to a p p e a r  - -  
f o r m u l a t e d  in the  Scho l ium to P39, I I I ,  I n  P39 itself he 
says that  o n e  who loves a n o t h e r  will e n d e a v o r  to do  h i m  
good,  a n d  in the  Scho l ium he exp la ins  that  by good  he 
u n d e r s t a n d s  "he re"  every k ind  of joy a n d  e v e r y t h i n g  that  
c o n d u c e s  to it, g iv ing  as his r eason  for  so u n d e r s t a n d i n g  it 
the  fact, p rev ious ly  es tabl ished,  that  we call a t h i ng  good 
because  we des i re  it a n d  do  not  des i re  it because  we j u d g e  
it good.  Now, had  he used this de f in i t i on  in d e m o n s t r a t i n g  
P8, IV, he  wou ld  have had  a m u c h  eas ier  t ime. Why  d id  he 
no t  use it? T h e  answer ,  I t h ink ,  is tha t  this a p p a r e n t l y  
hedon i s t i c  de f in i t i on  is no t  his most  basic one .  Most basic is 
the  o n e  used  in p r o v i n g  P8, IV; this o n e  is de r iva t ive  f r o m  
that  one ,  s ince it e m b o d i e s  an  e q u a t i o n  that  ne e ds  to be 
p r o v e d  by the  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of f u r t h e r  p remises .  In  fact, as 
I see it, this d e f i n i t i o n  in effect  p r e s u p p o s e s  Sp inoza ' s  po in t  
in P8 a n d  so cou ld  no t  be used  in p r o v i n g  it. P e r h a p s  this is 
why this de f in i t i on ,  if it may be cal led that ,  a p p e a r s  on ly  in 
a Scho l ium,  a n d  why he says it ind ica tes  what  he  m e a n s  by 
good  "here" .  At any  rate,  his basic de f in i t i on  is no t  a 
hedon i s t i c  one .  
Even  so, t he re  is a n o t h e r  po in t  to be no t i ced  for  o u r  
pu rposes .  O n  this de f in i t ion ,  KG wou ld  no t  necessar i ly  be a 
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consc iousness  of joy; it would  be e i the r  tha t  o r  a k n o w l e d g e  
that  x is c o n d u c i v e  to joy, which is no t  the  same th ing .  
T h e r e  would ,  in fact, be two k inds  of KG, a n d  so P8, IV, 
t h o u g h  it would  be par t ly  t rue ,  wou ld  no t  be  t r u e  w i thou t  
qual i f ica t ion.  T h e r e  is no  reason ,  even  on  Spinoza ' s  own  
gene ra l  theory ,  for  t h i n k i n g  that  k n o w i n g  x to be  good  as a 
m e a n s  is " n o t h i n g  but"  a consc iousness  of joy, even  if 
k n o w i n g  x to be good  as an  e n d  is such a consc iousness .  
Aga in  we f ind reason  to th ink ,  on  Spinoza ' s  ow n  terms,  that  
P8, a l t h o u g h  it tells a t ru th ,  does  no t  tell the  whole  t r u t h  
a n d  n o t h i n g  b u t  the  t ru th .  Even  if k n o w i n g  tha t  x is good  
as a m e a n s  to one ' s  e n d  is always a c c o m p a n i e d  by joy, 
which is deba tab le ,  it does  no t  follow that  it is " n o t h i n g  hu t "  
a consc iousness  of that  joy. 
It may be ob jec t ed  he re  that ,  a c c o r d i n g  to Sp inoza ' s  basic 
official def in i t ions ,  all j u d g m e n t s  of va lue  m u s t  be i n s t ru -  
m e n t a l  ones,  n o n e  of t hem can be j u d g m e n t s  of in t r ins ic  
value.  In  par t icu la r ,  Def. 1, IV, the de f in i t i on  usual ly  used  
in Spinoza ' s  p roofs  of PS, etc., says, "By good,  I u n d e r s t a n d  
that  which we cer ta in ly  know is usefu l  to us." Now it is t r u e  
that  he insists that  the t e rms  good  a n d  evil " ind ica te  
n o t h i n g  posit ive in th ings  c o n s i d e r e d  in themselves ,"  b e i n g  
pure ly  re la t ional .  If x is good ,  it mus t  be  good  to or  for  
someone .  G o o d n e s s  is no t  an  in t r ins ic  p r o p e r t y  in G. E. 
Moore ' s  sense for  Spinoza;  it is not  n o n - r e l a t i o n a l .  But  its 
be ing  re la t iona l  is compa t ib l e  with the m a k i n g  of j u d g -  
men t s  of in t r ins ic  value. Even  if "x is good"  m e a n s  "x is 
des i red  or  e n j o y e d  by y", it still may be that  y des i res  or  
en joys  x for  its own sake, a n d  not  just  because  of its 
consequences ,  i.e. that  it has in t r ins ic  va lue  to or  for  y. 
Never the less ,  it r e m a i n s  a fact that ,  except  for  the  secon-  
dary  de f in i t i on  jus t  d iscussed (which does allow for  j u d g -  
men t s  of in t r ins ic  value),  Sp inoza  does  word  his de f i n i t i ons  
in such a way as to seem to equa t e  va lue  with i n s t r u m e n t a l  
value. We shou ld  no t  infer ,  however ,  that  this is his real  
i n t en t i on .  For  o n e  th ing ,  this wou ld  be i n c o m p a t i b l e  with 
the th rus t  of P8 a n d  of the  de f in i t i on  jus t  r e f e r r e d  to. F o r  
a n o t h e r ,  as we shall see, Sp inoza  wants  to say la ter  tha t  
some th ings  are  "direct ly good"  a n d  ' ind i rec t ly"  bad  a n d  
vice versa. F u r t h e r m o r e ,  in P28, to which we will come,  
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S p i n o z a  c o n t e n d s  tha t  the  h ighes t  g o o d  of  t he  m i n d  is the  
k n o w l e d g e  of  God ,  us ing  Def.  1, IV,  in the  p roo f .  Yet he  
c a n n o t  real ly m e a n  that  the  k n o w l e d g e  o f  G o d  is g o o d  
s imply  because  it is c o n d u c i v e  to something else. It is t r u e  
that ,  verba l ly ,  he  w o u l d  say tha t  it is g o o d  b e c a u s e  it is 
c o n d u c i v e  to an inc rease  in one ' s  p e r f e c t i o n .  Bu t  his real  
po in t  is that  to be p e r f e c t  is to h a v e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n d  
k n o w l e d g e  o f  his s e c o n d  a n d  t h i rd  kinds,  no t  tha t  it is 
s o m e t h i n g  else to which  these  a re  on ly  means .  T h u s  he  is 
a sse r t ing ,  in effect ,  tha t  such u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n d  k n o w l e d g e  
a re  g o o d  as ends .  In J. S. Mill 's words ,  "x is c o n d u c i v e  to 
p e r f e c t i o n "  cover s  t h r e e  k inds  o f  cases fo r  Sp inoza :  t h e  case 
in which  x is s imply  a means to p e r f e c t i o n ,  e.g. t ak ing  
m e d i c i n e  o r  g r i n d i n g  lenses,  the  case in which  x is a part of  
p e r f e c t i o n  (or  p e r h a p s  e v e n  the  who le  o f  it), e.g. a 
k n o w l e d g e  o f  God ,  a n d  the  case in which  it is both e.g. a 
k n o w l e d g e  of  the  physics of  lenses. 
(2) In  t he  S c h o l i u m  to P39, I I I ,  Sp inoza  also makes  a 
ve ry  emot iv is t ic  s o u n d i n g  s t a t emen t .  
Each  p e r s o n  . . . a c c o r d i n g  to his affect j u d g e s  o r  
e s t ima tes  what  is g o o d  a n d  wha t  is evil . . . .  T h u s  the  
c o v e t o u s  m a n  th inks  p len ty  o f  m o n e y  to be the  best 
t h i n g  a n d  p o v e r t y  the  worst .  
H e  s eems  to th ink  that  this follows f r o m  his thesis that  we 
j u d g e  a t h ing  to be g o o d  because  we des i r e  it, not vice 
versa.  Actual ly ,  it asserts  s o m e t h i n g  b r o a d e r ,  viz. that  what  
o n e  j u d g e s  g o o d  o r  bad  is d e t e r m i n e d  by one ' s  affects o r  by 
the  affect  d o m i n a n t  in o n e  at the  t ime.  T h i s  is not  qu i t e  to 
say tha t  I j u d g e  x g o o d  because  I h a v e  a des i r e  fo r  it, but ,  
r a the r ,  that  I do  so because  I have  s o m e  affect  x bears  on,  
p e r h a p s  a des i r e  fo r  y, or ,  to use Sp inoza ' s  e x a m p l e s ,  
cove tousness ,  ambi t ion ,  o r  envy.  T h e  ma in  ques t ion ,  how-  
ever ,  is w h e t h e r  Sp inoza  can say this a n d  also ho ld  that  
j u d g i n g  x g o o d  = j u d g i n g  it to be  c o n d u c i v e  to self- 
p e r f e c t i o n .  It is c o m p a t i b l e  with P8, IV;  i n d e e d ,  he  
f o r m u l a t e s  this view in c o n n e c t i o n  with the  a p p a r e n t l y  
hedon i s t i c  de f in i t ion  of  g o o d  that  p r e s u p p o s e s  PS. Bu t  is it 
c o m p a t i b l e  with the  view that  " g o o d "  m e a n s  " c o n d u c i v e  to 
p e r f e c t i o n " ?  I be l ieve  it is, if we s u p p o s e  that  fo r  S p i n o z a  
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an affect l ike amb i t i on  o r  envy  can d e t e r m i n e ,  no t  only  
what  we f ind joy a n d  so r row in, but  also wha t  we p e r c e i v e  
as c o n d u c i v e  to o u r  p e r f e c t i o n .  S ince  he  eq ua t e s  f i nd ing  joy  
in a t h ing  with a k ind  of  p e r c e p t i o n  of  its c o n d u c i v e n e s s  to 
one ' s  p e r f e c t i o n ,  he  m i g h t  well t h ink  tha t  one ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  
of  this is a f fec ted  by one ' s  affects. T h e n ,  h o w e v e r ,  we may  
ask o n c e  m o r e  w h e t h e r  all of  o u r  j u d g m e n t s  of  va lue  a r e  
wholly d e t e r m i n e d  by o u r  affects in this way, a n d  especia l ly  
by those  that  a re  passions;  a n d  the  rep ly  mus t  be, it s eems  
to me,  (a) that  j u d g m e n t s  of  ex t r ins ic  va lue  may be at least 
par t ly  d e t e r m i n e d  by o u r  k n o w l e d g e  of  r e l e v a n t  facts, a n d  
(b) that  such va lue  j u d g m e n t s  as P28, IV, a re  d e t e r m i n e d ,  
not  so m u c h  by o u r  affects, as by o u r  fo l lowing  a ce r t a in  
l ine o f  a r g u m e n t  (even if o u r  affects d e t e r m i n e  w h e t h e r  we 
fol low this l ine of  a r g u m e n t  o r  not).  M o r e o v e r ,  (c), e v e n  if, 
o r  i n so fa r  as o u r  va lue  j u d g m e n t s  are  d e t e r m i n e d  by o u r  
emot ions ,  they are  not  necessar i ly  d e t e r m i n e d  by passions,  
fo r  t h e r e  a re  also act ive e m o t i o n s .  
(3) P58, I I I ,  needs  m e n t i o n  next .  It says that ,  bes ides  the  
joys which are  passions,  t h e r e  a re  affects of  joy which  a re  
r e l a t ed  to us insofa r  as we act, a po in t  which r e a p p e a r s  in 
IV, P52 and  the  p r o o f  of  P59. T h i s  means ,  I take it, tha t  
t he r e  a re  two kinds  of  joy,  o n e  a passion a n d  the  o t h e r  an 
act ive e m o t i o n ,  and ,  if this is so, then ,  by PS, IV, t h e r e  
mus t  in s o m e  sense be two c o r r e s p o n d i n g  a n d  s o m e w h a t  
d i f f e r e n t  k inds  of  K(; .  M o r e o v e r ,  by P1, I l l ,  the  first of  
t h e m  mus t  be i n a d e q u a t e  a n d  the  s e c o n d  a d e q u a t e .  O f  this 
m o r e  later.  
(4) N o t e  shou ld  also be  t aken  of the  fact that ,  bo th  in 
passages a l ready  r e f e r r e d  to a n d  in s o m e  o thers ,  S p i n o z a  
stresses the  relat ivi ty of  o u r  j u d g m e n t s  of  g o o d  a n d  evil9 
T h u s ,  in Preface ,  IV, he  writes:  
9 . . o n e  a n d  the  same  th ing  may at the  same  t ime  be 
bo th  g o o d  a n d  evil o r  ind i f fe ren t 9  Music,  fo r  e x a m p l e ,  
is g o o d  to a m e l a n c h o l y  pe r son ,  bad  to o n e  m o u r n i n g ,  
while  to a d e a f  man  it is n e i t h e r  g o o d  n o r  bad.  
Aga in ,  h o w e v e r ,  we mus t  be ca re fu l  what  i n f e r e n c e  we 
draw.  Sp inoza  is insis t ing that  va lue  is re la t iona l ,  bu t  he  is 
not  a relat ivist ,  excep t  p e r h a p s  abou t  the  va lue  of  th ings  
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like music,  m o n e y ,  glory,  etc. He  cer ta in ly  is no t  t h i n k i n g  
that  the  va lue  of u n d e r s t a n d i n g  in g e n e r a l  or  of the  
k n o w l e d g e  of God  in pa r t i cu la r  is relat ive;  such th ings  a re  
good  in  themselves ,  in the  sense ea r l i e r  exp l a ined ,  for  all 
h u m a n  be ings  w h e t h e r  they are  me l anc ho l y ,  deaf ,  or  
whatever .  It  is t r ue  that ,  in his p roo f  of P8, IV, Sp inoza  
seems to e m p h a s i z e  the  speaker - re la t iv i ty  of j u d g m e n t s  of 
value;  he  seems the re  r epea ted ly  to be say ing  that  one  calls 
good  that  which  is or  is pe rce ived  by h i m  to be c o n d u c i v e  
to his per fec t ion ,  en joyab l e  to h im,  etc. Back of this way of 
speak ing  is Def. 1, IV, q u o t e d  ear l ier .  Bu t  it is a m b i g u o u s .  
It  can m e a n  e i the r  that  the  good  is that  which o n e  knows is 
use fu l  to him or  that  it is what  h u m a n s  know to be use fu l  to 
eve ryone ,  a n d  p robab ly  Sp inoza  i n t e n d s  it to cover  bo th  
senses. At any  rate,  in the  sequel  to the  above  passage,  
Sp inoza  says that  by good  he u n d e r s t a n d s  "in the  fo l lowing 
pages e v e r y t h i n g  which we are ce r ta in  is a m e a n s  by which 
we may a p p r o a c h  n e a r e r  a n d  n e a r e r  to the  mode l  of 
h u m a n  n a t u r e  we set be fo re  us" - -  a n d  what  is good  in this 
sense is no t  relat ive to the  ind iv idua l ,  t h o u g h  it is, of 
course ,  relat ive to the  species. In  this respect ,  Sp inoza  is an 
objectivist  a b o u t  the  va lue  j u d g m e n t s  he  h imse l f  makes  in 
the  Ethics even  t h o u g h  he r e m a i n s  a re la t ionis t  t h r o u g h o u t .  
Whi le  this is so, however ,  Sp inoza  f o u n d  it necessary  to 
speak in the m o r e  speaker - re la t ive  way that is also pe rmi t -  
ted by his de f in i t ion  in o r d e r  to establish P8, IV. For  it 
would  ha rd ly  be p laus ible  for h im to c la im that  a know-  
ledge  of what  is benef ic ia l  to e v e r y o n e  can be e q u a t e d  with 
or  de r i ved  f r o m  a consc iousness  of one ' s  own joy at 
s o m e t h i n g .  No  d o u b t  this is why he does no t  use P8 in his 
proofs  of Ps. 27-28, etc., bu t  only w h e n  he wishes to p r ove  
p ropos i t ions  like Ps. 19, 64, etc. If so, t hen  we also see 
m o r e  clearly why he  f inds  the e q u a t i o n  in P8 i n t e r e s t i ng  
a n d  does no t  s top with the  one  that  follows f r o m  Def. 1, 
IV. However ,  even  if Sp inoza  had  he ld  in an  u n q u a l i f i e d  
way that  the  m e a n i n g  of a va lue  j u d g m e n t  is wholly 
speaker - re la t ive ,  he  still would  no t  necessar i ly  be  an  
emotivist .  For  he  migh t  m a i n t a i n  that  "x is good"  always 
m e a n s  "I des i re  (or take a p ro -a t t i t ude  toward)  x." In  A.J. 
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Ayer ' s  t e rms  he wou ld  t h e n  be c o n t e n d i n g  that  w h e n  o n e  
says a t h i n g  is good  one  is asserting that  o n e  des i res  or  
favors  it, o n e  is no t  jus t  expressing one ' s  des i re  or  l iking.  
V 
(5) Ps. 14-17, IV, m a k e  r e f e r e n c e  to KGE,  b u t  we shall  
c o n s i d e r  t h e m  only insofa r  as they bea r  on  o u r  i nqu i ry ,  no t  
as they re la ted  to the topics of h u m a n  b o n d a g e  or  f r e e d o m .  
T h e  first t h i n g  that  str ikes the  eye t h e n  is the  fact tha t  
Sp inoza  speaks  here ,  no t  jus t  of  KGE,  b u t  of " t rue"  KGE,  
m a k i n g  it c lear  tha t  he  m e a n s  P8 to be t r u e  of such KGE.  
Bu t  now the  ques t i on  arises: Is t he re  false KGE or  is all 
KGE t rue?  T h e  fact that  Sp inoza  calls it k n o w l e d g e  does  
no t  m e a n  he  believes it is all t rue ,  for  no t  all k n o w l e d g e  of 
the  first k ind ,  as he calls it, is r e g a r d e d  by h i m  as t rue .  O n  
the  o the r  h a n d ,  in P I 6  a n d  its p roo f  he  talks of K G E a n d  
t rue  KGE as it they were i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e ,  and ,  actual ly,  I 
bel ieve Sp inoza  mus t  ho ld  that  any  idea  of joy, h o w e v e r  
con fused ,  mus t  con t a in  some  t r u e  k n o w l e d g e  of good  (i.e. 
some  t rue  p e r c e p t i o n  of an  increase  in one ' s  pe r fec t ion) ,  
except  where  the  joy is excessive, as it may be. It is t r u e  
that  in his p roo f  of P15 Sp inoza  says th ings  which imply  
the  view that  t r ue  KGE can only  be a d e q u a t e  k n o w l e d g e ,  
i.e. k n o w l e d g e  of the  second  or  th i rd  k ind ,  bu t  he  c a n n o t  
really be h o l d i n g  this view, for  he  later  c o n t e n d s ,  as we 
shall see, tha t  KE is always i n a d e q u a t e  k n o w l e d g e  (know-  
ledge  of the first kind) .  In  any  case, I t h ink  he is c o m m i t t e e  
to the  pos i t ion  that  the re  are  two k inds  of KG, o n e  
a d e q u a t e  a n d  the o the r  i n a d e q u a t e ,  a n d  both  t rue ,  o n e  
con fused ly  a n d  the o the r  clearly a n d  dis t inct ly - -  of which 
also m o r e  later.  It is t r ue  that  he  says falsity consists  in the  
p r iva t ion  of k n o w l e d g e  which i n a d e q u a t e  ideas involve,  bu t  
this is cons i s ten t  with h o l d i n g  that  such ideas also c o n t a i n  
t ru th .  
In  Ps. 14-15 a n d  the i r  proofs ,  bo th  of which use  P8, 
Sp inoza  d i s t ingu i shes  be tween  KGE insofa r  as it i~ t r u e  a n d  
KGE insofa r  as it is an affect. It  has t h e n  s o m e h o w  two 
aspects. It  is t e m p t i n g  to recall  Sp inoza ' s  d i s t inc t ion  be-  
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t w e e n  a n  a f f e c t  o f  j o y  a n d  t h e  i d e a  o f  t h a t  a f f e c t  a n d  t o  say 
t h a t  it is t h e  l a t t e r  t h a t  is t r u e  a n d  t h e  f o r m e r  t h a t  is a n  
a f f e c t  ( t h e  t w o  b e i n g  as i d e n t i c a l  as  t h o s e  t w o  s i d e s  o f  a 
c o i n ,  t h e  m i n d  a n d  t h e  b o d y ,  so  t h a t  in  a s e n s e  i t  is t h e  
s a m e  t h i n g  t h a t  is b o t h  t r u e  a n d  a n  a f fec t ) .  B u t  t h i s  will  n o t  
d o  if ,  as S p i n o z a  e x p l i c i t l y  h o l d s ,  it is o n l y  t h e  l a t t e r  t h a t  is 
a c o g n i t i o n  o f  g o o d .  A n d ,  if  w e  a d d  t h a t  t h e  f o r m e r  is a l so  
a k i n d  o f  c o g n i t i o n  o f  g o o d ,  as  I s u g g e s t e d  e a r l i e r ,  t h e n  it  
wil l  n o t  d o  e i t h e r .  O n e  m u s t  say,  it s e e m s  to  m e ,  t h a t  b o t h  
o f  t h e m  h a v e  b o t h  o f  t h e  a s p e c t s  in  q u e s t i o n .  I n  a n y  e v e n t ,  
i n  i n s i s t i n g  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  P 8  t h a t  K G E  is a n  a f f e c t  a n d  n o t  
s i m p l y  t r u e ,  S p i n o z a  s e e m s  t o  b e  i m p l y i n g  t h a t  i t  is n o t  j u s t  
" a n  i d e a  by  w h i c h  t h e  m i n d  a f f i r m s  a g r e a t e r  o r  less  p o w e r  
o f  e x i s t e n c e  f o r  t h e  b o d y  t h a n  it p o s s e s s e d  b e f o r e , "  b u t  
s o m e t h i n g  w i t h  a n  a f f e c t i v e  q u a l i t y  as  well .  9 
(6) T h i s  b r i n g s  u s  to  P I g ,  I V ,  t h e  p r o o f  o f  w h i c h  a l s o  
u s e s  PS.  I t  s t a t e s  t h a t  o n e  n e c e s s a r i l y  d e s i r e s  t h a t  w h i c h  h e  
c o n s i d e r s  to  b e  g o o d .  I n  fac t ,  Ps. 1 5 - 1 7  a l r e a d y  i m p l i e d  t h a t  
a ( t r u e )  K G  g e n e r a t e s  d e s i r e  f o r  t h e  o b j e c t s  i n v o l v e d .  T h i s  
s e e m s  to  m e a n  t h a t  S p i n o z a  t h i n k s  t h a t ,  w h e n  t h i s  h a p p e n s ,  
we d e s i r e  w h a t  we  d e s i r e  because we j u d g e  o r  k n o w  it to  b e  
g o o d ,  w h i c h  is n o t  w h a t  o n e  w o u l d  e x p e c t  a n  e m o t i v i s t  to  
h o l d .  H o w e v e r ,  as  was  i n d i c a t e d  e a r l i e r ,  S p i n o z a  e l s e w h e r e  
is v e r y  i n s i s t e n t  t h a t  
we n e i t h e r  s t r i v e  fo r ,  w i s h ,  s e e k ,  n o r  d e s i r e  a n y t h i n g  
b e c a u s e  we  l h i n k  it to  h e  g o o d ,  b u t ,  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  
we  a d j u d g e  a t h i n g  to  b e  g o o d  b e c a u s e  we  s t r i v e  fo r ,  
w i s h ,  s e e k ,  o r  d e s i r e  i t ?  ~' 
H e  a l so  s e e m s  t o  m e a n  t h i s  w i t h o u t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  i.e. t h a t  
we  n e v e r  d e s i r e  a t h i n g  b e c a u s e  w e  j u d g e  it g o o d  b u t  
a l w a y s  j u d g e  it g o o d  b e c a u s e  we  d e s i r e  it. T h i s  is t h e  s o r t  o f  
t h i n g  a n  e m o t i v i s t  w o u l d  m o s t  n a t u r a l l y  say.  A l s o ,  if it is 
m e a n t  w i t h o u t  q u a l i f i c a t i o n ,  it is c o n t r a d i c t e d  by  Ps. 14 -19 ,  
I V ,  if  t h e s e  l a t e r  p r o p o s i t i o n s  m u s t  b e  t a k e n  to  m e a n  t h a t  
we  s o m e t i m e s  d e s i r e  a t h i n g  because we j u d g e  it t o  b e  g o o d ,  
as s e e m s  to  b e  t h e  case .  T h i s  r a i s e s  t h e  t h i r d  o f  t h e  
~' For the words quoted see Dernonst. P 14, IV. 
'" Schol. P 9, III. 
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p r o b l e m s  a b o u t  S p i n o z a ' s  m e t a - e t h i c s  m e n t i o n e d  in m y  
i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  b e s i d e s  b e a r i n g  o n  t h e  f irst .  B e f o r e  c o m m e n t -  
i n g  o n  it, h o w e v e r ,  let  us  c o n s i d e r  w h a t  Ps. 14-19  say. As  I 
sa id ,  t h e y  s e e m  to  a f f i r m  t h a t  we  s o m e t i m e s  d e s i r e  a t h i n g  
b e c a u s e  we  b e l i e v e  o r  k n o w  it to b e  g o o d ,  b u t  th is  still 
l e aves  t w o  poss ib i l i t i e s :  
(a) t ha t  th is  d e s i r e  is g e n e r a t e d  by K G  i n s o f a r  as it is 
t r u e ,  
(b) t h a t  th is  d e s i r e  is g e n e r a t e d  by K G  o n l y  i n s o f a r  as it 
is an  a f f ec t  o f  j o y  
O n  t h e  f i r s t  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  t h e  m e r e  fac t  t h a t  we  k n o w  t h a t  x 
c o n t r i b u t e s  to  t h e  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  o u r  b e i n g  g e n e r a t e s  a 
d e s i r e  f o r  x; o n  t h e  s e c o n d ,  it d o e s  n o t .  W h a t  S p i n o z a  says 
in P14  a n d  in t h e  p r o o f  o f  P 1 9  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  h e  e s p o u s e s  
(b), s i nce  it i n v o l v e s  i n s i s t i n g  tha t ,  by P8,  K G  is t h e  a f fec t  o f  
j oy  i t se l f  i n s o f a r  as we  a r e  c o n s c i o u s  o f  it; t h a t  it is t r u e  
s e e m s  n o t  to  p lay  a ro l e .  H e  c o u l d ,  h o w e v e r ,  a g r e e  t h a t  (a) 
is s o m e t i m e s  t r u e ,  s ince  h e  t h i n k s  o f  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  m a n  as 
an  e n d e a v o r  to  p e r s e v e r e  in o n e ' s  b e i n g ?  ~ F o r ,  g i v e n  this  
conatus ,  o n e  will n e c e s s a r i l y  d e s i r e  x if  o n e  j u d g e s  it to  b e  
u s e f u l  in p r e s e r v i n g  o r  p e r f e c t i n g  o n e ' s  b e i n g .  I t  m a y  a lso  
be,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  S p i n o z a  w o u l d  r e g a r d  t h e  c h o i c e  
b e t w e e n  (a) a n d  (b) as a c a d e m i c ,  b e c a u s e  f o r  h i m  a 
k n o w l e d g e  t h a t  x is u s e f u l  to  us  a n d  a c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  j oy  
a b o u t  x a r e  two  s ides  o f  t h e  s a m e  co in .  B u t ,  if  th is  is so, 
w h y  d o e s  h e  insis t  in P14  tha t  n o  a f f ec t  can  be  r e s t r a i n e d  by 
t h e  t r u e  K G E  i n s o f a r  as it is t r u e ,  b u t  o n l y  i n s o f a r  as it is 
an  a f fec t?  
P e r h a p s  a c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o o f  o f  P19  will  h e l p  us  
b o t h  wi th  th is  q u e s t i o n  a n d  wi th  t h a t  o f  r e c o n c i l i n g  P19  
wi th  Scho l .  P9,  I I l .  F o r  us  t h e  c r u c i a l  p a r t  g o e s  as fo l lows :  
1. K G  = t h e  a f fec t  o f  j oy  i t se l f  i n s o f a r  as we  a r e  
c o n s c i o u s  o f  it. P8,  IV .  
2. W e  e n d e a v o r  to  b r i n g  i n t o  e x i s t e n c e  w h a t e v e r  we  
i m a g i n e  c o n d u c e s  to  joy .  P28,  I I I .  
" P 7 ,  I I .  
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3. T h e r e f o r e ,  o n e  n e c e s s a r i l y  d e s i r e s  t h a t  w h i c h  h e  
c o n s i d e r s  to  b e  g o o d .  
T h e  c f i n c h i n g  p o i n t  s e e m s  to  b e  t h a t  c o n s i d e r i n g  a t h i n g  to  
b e  g o o d  = i m a g i n i n g  it t o  b e  c o n d u c i v e  t o  j o y  = b e i n g  
c o n s c i o u s  o f  i t  w i t h  joy .  N o w ,  h e r e  a g a i n ,  we  m a y  r a i s e  o u r  
e a r l i e r  q u e s t i o n  w h e t h e r  P 8  e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  f i r s t  o f  t h e s e  t w o  
e q u a t i o n s .  E v e n  if  it e s t a b l i s h e s  t h a t  j u d g i n g  o r  k n o w i n g  x 
to  b e  g o o d  in  i t s e l f  = b e i n g  c o n s c i o u s  o f  it w i t h  j oy ,  it d o e s  
n o t  t h e r e b y  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  j u d g i n g  x to  b e  g o o d  as  a m e a n s  
= b e i n g  c o n s c i o u s  o f  i t  w i t h  joy .  B u t ,  h o w e v e r  t h i s  m a y  be ,  
w e  m u s t  o b s e r v e  t h a t  S p i n o z a  is h e r e  in  e f f e c t  a s s e r t i n g  o n l y  
t h a t ,  i f  we a r e  c o n s c i o u s  o f  x w i t h  j o y  ( =  j u d g i n g  o r  
k n o w i n g  it to  b e  g o o d ) ,  t h e n  we  n e c e s s a r i l y  d e s i r e  it. H e  is 
n o t  q u i t e  s a y i n g  t h a t  we  t h e n  d e s i r e  it b e c a u s e  we  a r e  
c o n s c i o u s  o f  it w i t h  j o y  ( o r  because we j u d g e  o r  k n o w  it to  
b e  g o o d ) .  C e r t a i n l y  h e  is n o t  c l a i m i n g  t h a t ,  w h e n e v e r  w e  
d e s i r e  a t h i n g ,  we  d o  so  b e c a u s e  we  a r e  c o n s c i o u s  o f  it w i t h  
j o y  o r  b e c a u s e  we  j u d g e  o r  k n o w  it t o  b e  g o o d .  Stil l ,  h e  
d o e s  e l s e w h e r e  s e e m  to  h o l d  t h a t  we s o m e t i m e s  d e s i r e  a 
t h i n g  because we j u d g e  o r  k n o w  it t o  b e  g o o d  o r  because we 
a r e  c o n s c i o u s  o f  it w i t h  joy."-' W e  m u s l  s i m p l y  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  
S p i n o z a  c a n n o t  c o n s i s t e n t l y  m a i n t a i n  tha~ we  always j u d g e  x 
to  h e  g o o d  because we d e s i r e  it o r  t h a t  we n e v e r  d e s i r e  it 
b e c a u s e  we j u d g e  it  t o  b e  g o o d .  C o n t r a r y  to  Schol. 1'9, I I1 ,  h e  
mus~ h e  b e l i e v i n g  l h a t  we s o m e t i m e s  d e s i r e  x b e c a u s e  w e  
j u d g e  o r  k n o w  it t o  b e  g o o d  ( =  b e i n g  c o n s c i o u s  ~ f  it w i t h  
j oy ) ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  we  a l so  s o m e l i m e s  j u d g e  o r  k n o w  it t o  b e  
g o o d  ( a n d  a r e  c o n s c i o u s  o f  i! w i th  joy)  b e c a u s e  we  d e s i r e  it. 
T h i s  m o r e  q u a l i f i e d  p o s i t i o n  is c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  h i s  a l s o  
h o l d i n g ,  as h e  c e r t a i n l y  m e a n s  to,  t h a t  we w o u l d  n o t  j u d g e  
o r  k n o w  anything t o  b e  g o o d ,  o r  b e  c o n s c i o u s  o f  it w i t h  j o y ,  
if we  d i d  n o r  f i r s t  h a v e  a d e s i r e  to  p r e s e r v e  o r  p e r f e c t  
o u r s e l v e s .  For ,  e v e n  i f  t h i s  is t r u e ,  it still  m a y  h e  t h a t  w e  
m a y  n o t  d e s i r e  a c e r t a i n  x u n l e s s  we j u d g e  it t o  b e  g o o d  o r  
a r e  c o n s c i o u s  o f  it w i t h  j oy  - -  o r  e v e n  t h a t  we never d e s i r e  a 
p a r l i c u l a r  x u n l e s s  we  so j u d g e  o r  a r e  c o n s c i o u s  o f  it. W e  
m a y  a l so  o b s e r v e  t h a t ,  w h i l e  t h i s  m o r e  q u a l i f i e d  v i e w  is 
'~ P 28, t l i ;  Ps. 14-I7, IV. 
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c o m p a t i b l e  with an  emot iv i sm m a i n t a i n i n g  that  w h e n  o n e  
makes  a va lue  j u d g m e n t  one  is direct ly or  ind i rec t ly  
e x p r e s s i n g  one ' s  basic conatus to pe r seve re  in  one ' s  be ing ,  it 
is also cons i s t en t  with a n a t u r a l i s m  c o n t e n d i n g  that  "x is 
good"  m e a n s  "x is c o n d u c i v e  to se l f -p rese rva t ion . "  
(7) Next ,  we m u s t  e x a m i n e  Ps. 27-28, IV. In  t h e m  
Sp inoza  is no t  d o i n g  meta-e th ics ;  he  is m a k i n g  ce r t a in  va lue  
j u d g m e n t s  h imsel f ,  a n d  he is c la iming ,  no t  on ly  that  they 
are  t rue ,  bu t  that  he  can p rove  them.  T h i s  m e a n s  that  he  
bel ieves t h e m  to cons t i tu te  a d e q u a t e  k n o w l e d g e  of the  
second  k ind .  T h e  two value  j u d g m e n t s  are:  
a. T h a t  which c o n d u c e s  to u n d e r s t a n d i n g  is (cer ta inly)  
good  ( and  that  a lone) .  
b. T h e  h ighes t  good  of the m i n d  is the  k n o w l e d g e  of 
God.  
W h a t  in te res ts  me now is no t  the  c o n t e n t  of these  va lue  
j u d g m e n t s  b u t  the i r  f o rm a n d  the  imp l i ed  c la im that they 
cons t i tu t e  a k ind  of KG that  is a d e q u a t e  or  clearly a n d  
dis t inct ly t rue .  In  f o r m  they are g e n e r a l  or  un ive rsa l ;  what  
is said to be good  is not  some pa r t i cu l a r  t h i ng  bu t  a k ind  of 
th ing .  T h e  ques t i on  (once more)  is w h e t h e r  Sp inoza  th inks  
that  such gene ra l  k n o w l e d g e  too is " n o t h i n g  hut"  all affect 
of joy inso fa r  as we are consc ious  of it. It is h a r d  to see 
how he can bel ieve this, even if he  is t a lk ing  only  a hou t  
k n o w l e d g e  of what  is good  in itself, a n d  not abou t  
k n o w l e d g e  of what  is good  mere ly  as a means .  It is easier  to 
bel ieve that  k n o w i n g  a pa r t i cu la r  t h i n g  to be good  in itself 
is a consc iousness  of joy in tha t  t h ing  t han  that  k n o w i n g  a 
g e n e r a l  t r u th  abou t  what  is good  in itself is a consc iousness  
of joy at a k ind  of th ing .  Is k n o w l e d g e  of the  sort  inw)lved 
in Ps. 27-28 = consc iousness  of joy in ge t t ing  u n d e r s t a n d -  
ing or  a k n o w l e d g e  of God?  Is it not  r a t h e r  a m a t t e r  of 
g r a s p i n g  the proofs  offered hy Spinoza?  We cer ta in ly  seem 
the re  to be k n o w i n g  these two t ru ths ,  no t  via a consc ious-  
ness of joy, bu t  via a deduc t i ve  a r g u m e n t ,  if we know t h e m  
at all - -  a deduc t i ve  a r g u m e n t ,  m o r e o v e r ,  which c o n t a i n s  
no  m e n t i o n  of any  joy that  a c c o m p a n i e s  the  ge t t i ng  of 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  or of a k n o w l e d g e  of God ,  a n d  also no  use 
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of P8. Even  if o u r  c o m i n g  to know these two p r o p o s i t i o n s  
abou t  what  is good  is itself a c c o m p a n i e d  by a consc iousness  
of joy, it c a n n o t  be  this joy that  cons t i tu tes  a c ogn i t i on  of 
the  g o o d n e s s  of  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  in  g e n e r a l  o r  of a know-  
ledge  of God  in par t icu la r .  Aga in ,  it a p p e a r s  tha t  P8 c a n n o t  
p laus ib ly  be t rue  of all KG. If  o u r  KG in Ps. 27-28 comes  to 
us t h r o u g h  its b e i n g  p r o v e d  that  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  th ings  a n d  
k n o w i n g  God  are  p ro f i t ab le  to the  m i n d  a n d  no t  t h r o u g h  
o u r  f i n d i n g  joy in such u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n d  k n o w i n g ,  t h e n  it 
will ha rd ly  do  to c o n t e n d  that  all KG = f i n d i n g  joy in such 
activities of the  m i n d .  Even  if such KG a n d  such joy were  
s o m e h o w  ontological ly  one ,  as m i n d  a n d  body  are,  they 
wou ld  no t  be  in the  same boat  epis temical ly .  
It may be that  Sp inoza  would  wish to reply h e r e  tha t  
the re  are  two ways of k n o w i n g  that  the k n o w l e d g e  of G od  
is good:  a d iscurs ive  way via g r a s p i n g  his p r oo f  a n d  a m o r e  
d i rec t  o r  in tu i t ive  way via f i n d i n g  joy in such knowledge .  
T h i s  is what  I t h ink  he  shou ld  say, bu t  t hen  aga in  he mus t  
d i s t i ngu i sh  two k inds  of KG a n d  app ly  P8 - -  a n d  p e r h a p s  
also some  of the  o t h e r  th ings  he says a b o u t  KG - -  to only  
o n e  of them.  
(8) Ps. 41-48 shou ld  be no t iced  here .  In t h e m  aga in  
Sp inoza  is m a k i n g  a n d  p u r p o r t i n g  to p rove  va lue  j u d g -  
m e n t s  like: 
(a) Joy is direct ly good.  
(b) Sor row is di rect ly  evil. 
(c) C h e e r f u l n e s s  is always good.  
(d) Pain  may be indi rec t ly  good.  
(e) H a t r e d  can n e v e r  be good.  
(f) H o p e  a n d  fear  can be good  only  inso fa r  as they are  
able to res t ra in  excesses of joy. 
Some  of these are  g e n e r a l  j u d g m e n t s  of in t r ins ic  va lue  a n d  
some g e n e r a l  j u d g m e n t s  of ex t r ins ic  value,  and ,  o n c e  more ,  
it seems to me that  on  Spinoza ' s  own te rms  j u d g m e n t s  of 
bo th  k inds  e m b o d y  a sort  of KG that  is no t  n o t h i n g  bu t  an  
affect of joy inso fa r  as we are consc ious  of it. In  pa r t i cu la r ,  
I t h ink  that  k n o w i n g  ce r ta in  joys to be excessive a n d  
k n o w i n g  cer ta in  pa ins  to be ind i rec t ly  good  c a n n o t  be  
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equa ted ,  respect ively,  with b e i n g  conscious  of sor row or  joy 
in e x p e r i e n c i n g  those joys or  pains .  In  any  case, we shou ld  
observe  that  Sp inoza  is here  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  two cases of KG, 
viz. k n o w l e d g e  of d i rect  goodnes s  a n d  k n o w l e d g e  of 
ind i rec t  goodness ,  a n d  mus t  be t h i n k i n g  that  k n o w l e d g e  of 
bo th  sorts may be adequa te .  
We may now useful ly  restate  o n e  resul t  of  o u r  
d iscuss ions  in  (1), (7), a n d  (8) as follows Not  every piece of 
KG comes via joy e x p e r i e n c e d  at the t ime of the  k n o w i n g  
or  j u d g i n g  on Spinoza ' s  view, t h o u g h  P8, IV, suggests  it 
does.  Even if it is a c c o m p a n i e d  by joy, this will be joy at 
h a v i n g  that  piece of knowledge ,  i.e. this joy will be a 
cogn i t ion  of the  goodness  of that  bit of KG, no t  a cogn i t i on  
of the  goodnes s  of s o m e t h i n g  not  go ing  on  at the  m o m e n t .  
But  we do somet imes  have k n o w l e d g e  of the value,  d i rect  
or  indi rec t ,  of s o m e t h i n g  that  is not  go ing  on at the  t ime,  
e.g. when  we km)w that exercise is c o n d u c i v e  to hea l th  or  
that k n o w l e d g e  of (~od is the  highest  g{>od. It still may be, 
however ,  thai every joy or  consc iousness  of joy is or  
inc ludes  a j u d g m e n t  of va lue  1hat is at least part ly t rue .  
Also in Ps. 41ff, Spinoza  says that joy may be excessive 
a n d / o r  indi rec t ly  had,  but  m a i n t a i n s  that  chee r fu lnes s ,  a 
cer ta in  k ind  of joy, can neve r  he excessive a n d  so is always 
good.  His a r g u m e n t  is tllal chee r fu lne s s  is joy which,  
insofa r  as i! is re la ted to !he body (as, of course ,  it basically 
is), consists  il~ the  fact !hat all par ts  of lhe  hody  are  equal ly  
affected, so that the hody 's  power  of act ion is i nc reased  or  
ass i s ted  t h r o u g h o u t ,  w i t h o u t  any  o p p o s i n g  t e n d e n c y .  
T h e r e f o r e  it is good  both direct ly a n d  ind i rec t ly  (or wholly 
good).  
If this is so, then  !here  are  two k inds  of joy: those that  
may be excessive a~ld/or indi rec t ly  bad a n d  those that  can 
neve r  he excessive or  bad.  But this seems to imply  that  
the re  are two c o r r e s p o n d i n g  k inds  of p e r c e p t i o n  (or 
knowledge)  of good:  (a) !hose consc iousnesses  of joy !hat 
are  or may he mislea(li~lg because  the ioy is actual ly 
excessive or  indirect ly  bad,  a n d  (b) those that  are always 
ent i re ly  veridical .  In the fo rmer ,  as was ind ica ted  ear l ier ,  
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t h e r e  is always s o m e  t r u t h  (for  joy is always di rec t ly  good) ,  
but  t h e r e  is o r  may  also be s o m e  e r r o r ;  t h e r e  is e r r o r  
i n so fa r  as the  o u t c o m e  of  what  is r e p o r t e d  as g o o d  via the  
f ee l ing  of  joy is a ne t  d e c r e a s e  in the  body ' s  p o w e r  of  
ac t ion  (or in one ' s  pe r f ec t ion . )  In the  la t te r  t h e r e  is n o t h i n g  
bu t  t ru th ,  t h o u g h  the  t r u th  may be c o n f u s e d l y  pe r ce ived .  It  
may  be  that  this d i s t inc t ion  col lapses  in to  that  a l r eady  m a d e  
b e t w e e n  joys that  a re  passive and  those  that  a re  act ive  (and  
b e t w e e n  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  k inds  of  KG). It does ,  if c h e e r f u l -  
ness is an act ive joy,  whi le  those  that  may be excess ive  are  
passive ones.  It is no t  clear ,  h o w e v e r ,  that  S p i n o z a  r e g a r d s  
c h e e r f u l n e s s  as an act ive e m o t i o n .  T h e  S c h o l i u m  to P l l ,  
I I I ,  impl ies  that  it is a passion,  but  a la ter  passage  leaves  
this q u e s t i o n  o p e n ,  a n d  the  p r o o f  of  P59, IV, is a m b i g u o u s  
on the  point .  
V I I  
(9) In  his S c h o l i u m  to P62, IV, Sp inoza  r e m i n d s  us that  
o u r  k n o w l e d g e  of  the  d u r a t i o n  of  th ings  is very i n a d e q u a t e  
and  largely  based  on the  imag ina t i on ,  so that  o u r  j u d g -  
m e n t s  abou t  the  o r d e r  of  th ings  a n d  the  c o n n e c t i o n  of  
causes  a re  r a t h e r  i m a g i n a r y  than real.  T h e n  he  adds  that ,  
as a resuh ,  the  t rue  K ( ; E  we have  is "only  abs t rac t  o r  
un ive r sa l , "  and  that this is why the des i r e  to which it g ives  
rise is so i m p o t e n t  agains t  o t h e r  desires .  H e r e  be  seems  to 
be t h i n k i n g  mainly  of  o u r  k n o w l e d g e  of  ind i rec t  g o o d  and  
evil, hut  he  must  m e a n  what  he  is saying to app ly  to that o f  
d i r ec t  g o o d  a n d  evil as well. H e  also seems  to imply  that  we 
have  no  t r u e  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t he  va lue  o f  pa r t i cu l a r  th ings ,  as 
I h a v e  been  a s s u m i n g  we do.  I d o u b t ,  h o w e v e r ,  that he  can 
m e a n  this. In fact,, his p r emi se s  a n d  conc lus ions  h e r e  will 
apply  at least as m u c h  to o u r  k n o w l e d g e  of  the  va lue  of  
pa r t i cu l a r  th ings  as to that  of  the va lue  of  k inds  of  things.  
H e  m i g h t  even  be t h i n k i n g  that  o u r  k n o w l e d g e  of  pa r t i cu-  
lar th ings  is "abs t rac t "  too, in the  sense of  i nvo lv ing  
i n a d e q u a t e  k n o w l e d g e  of  the i r  contexts .  In any case, he  is 
obvious ly  s p e a k i n g  main ly  abou t  such KGE as is inade -  
qua te ,  aga in  n e g l e c t i n g  to m e n t i o n  that  t he r e  is a d e q u a t e  
KGE.  T h u s ,  he  is not  necessar i ly  h o l d i n g  that  the  la t te r  is 
"only  abs t rac t  a n d  un ive r sa l , "  o r  that  the  des i r e  it g e n e r a t e s  
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is weak  re la t ively  to o t h e r  desires .  I n d e e d ,  if K G E  can he 
k n o w l e d g e  of  his t h i rd  k ind ,  i.e. i n tu i t ive  k n o w l e d g e ,  t hen  
such tene t s  c a n n o t  be t r u e  of  it. It may  be, h o w e v e r ,  that  
Sp inoza  is h e r e  implic i t ly  d e n y i n g  tha t  K G E  can e v e r  be  
in tu i t ive  in this way - -  that  it is at best  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t he  
s e c o n d  kind.  ~:~ But ,  e v e n  then ,  o n e  may  ask w h e t h e r  
Sp inoza  i n t ends  what  he  says h e r e  to be  t r u e  of  the  KG 
e m b o d i e d  in P28, IV. T h o u g h  not  based  on i m a g i n a t i o n  o r  
i n a d e q u a t e  k n o w l e d g e ,  it is "only  abs t rac t  a n d  u n i v e r s a l "  in 
a way in which  k n o w l e d g e  of  the  th i rd  k ind  is not ,  a n d  so 
p r e s u m a b l y  a des i r e  a r i s ing  f r o m  it w o u l d  no t  be  as s t r o n g  
as o n e  based  on the  th i rd  k ind  of  k n o w l e d g e .  At  the  same  
t ime,  P62 itself seems  to imply  that  such a de s i r e  is not  so 
i m p o t e n t  agains t  des i res  fo r  p r e s e n t  th ings  as des i res  fo r  
f u t u r e  ones  are.  
(10) In P64, IV, Sp inoza  says that  the  k n o w l e d g e  of  ev|l is 
i n a d e q u a t e  k n o w l e d g e .  T h i s  is the  o n e  poin t ,  m e n t i o n e d  
ear l ier ,  on  which  what  he  says abou t  KG does  not  app ly  to 
KE For ,  as we have  seen,  KG is s o m e t i m e s  a d e q u a t e  
k n o w l e d g e  of  Sp inoza ' s  second  kind,  t h o u g h  he  does  
s o m e w h a t  fail to e m p h a s i z e  this fact. In his p r o o f  of  P64 he  
uses P8 to show that  KE is so r row inso fa r  as we a re  
consc ious  of  it, a n d  a r g u e s  that ,  s ince so r row is a passion 
res t ing  on i n a d e q u a t e  ideas,  t h e r e f o r e  the  k n o w l e d g e  of  
so r row (= KE) is i n a d e q u a t e .  In my o p i n i o n ,  h o w e v e r ,  even  
if this conc lus ion  is t r u e  for  some  KE, it canno t  be t r u e  for  
all of  it. In cases (h) a n d  (e) listed u n d e r  (5) we h a v e  pieces  
of  KE that  can be p r o v e d  in Sp inoza ' s  system a n d  t h e r e f o r e  
cons t i tu te  a d e q u a t e  k n o w l e d g e  of  ~he s e c o n d  k ind .  T h a t  the  
g rea tes t  evil of  the  m i n d  is i g n o r a n c e  o f  G o d  ( the  c o r r e l a t e  
of  P28, IV) would  he a n o t h e r  ins t ance  of  such KE. E i l h e r  
such KE = consc iousness  of  so r row or  so r row does  not  
d e p e n d  on hav ing  i n a d e q u a t e  ideas. Sure ly  Sp inoza  wou ld  
p r e f e r  the  first a l t e rna t ive ,  which aga in  involves  qua l i f y ing  
P8, bu t  in e i t h e r  case he  mus t  also qual i fy  P64. 
(11) In the  Coro l l a ry  to 1'64 Sp inoza  adds  lha!  it fol lows 
the  h u m a n  m i n d  wou ld  have  no no t ion  of  evil  if it had  
,2 On this point see P 36, V. 
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n o n e  bu t  a d e q u a t e  ideas.  If  I am  c o r r e c t  in saying tha t  no t  
all KE is actual ly i n a d e q u a t e  on  his view, t h e n  he  is 
m i s t aken  in t h i n k i n g  this follows. Be this as it may,  he  
e l abo ra t e s  his po in t  in an i n t e r e s t i n g  way in P68, IV:  ~4 
I f  m e n  were  b o r n  f ree ,  they w o u l d  f o r m  no  c o n c e p -  
t ion  of  g o o d  a n d  evil so long  as they  r e m a i n e d  f ree .  
F o r  t h e n  they w o u l d  h a v e  only a d e q u a t e  ideas  a n d  h e n c e  
no  c o n c e p t  of  evil,  and ,  s ince g o o d  a n d  evil a re  co r r e l a t i ve ,  
no  c o n c e p t  of  g o o d  e i t h e r  - -  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  no  K G E  
wha t soeve r .  H e r e  we may ask jus t  which  c o n c e p t s  a n d  
which  k n o w l e d g e  we w o u l d  not  h a v e  if we w e r e  fully f ree .  
It is c lear  that  we wou ld  not  have  any c o n f u s e d  o r  
i n a d e q u a t e  ideas  o r  k n o w l e d g e  a n d  h e n c e  no  K G E  involv-  
ing t hem,  but  we migh t  still have  K G E  cons i s t ing  o f  
a d e q u a t e  ideas  a n d  a d e q u a t e  k n o w l e d g e ,  s ince t h e r e  may 
he such KGE.  Agains t  the  b a c k g r o u n d  of  Sp inoza ' s  system, 
t h e r e  s e e m  to be the  fo l lowing  r e l evan t  concep t s  we m i g h t  
o r  m i g h t  not  have  if we were  fully f ree :  
(a) the  idea of  an af fec t ion  of  the  body  in which its 
p o w e r  of  act ion is i nc reased ,  in which  it passes to a g r e a t e r  
p e r f e c t i o n ,  etc. (= the  affect of  joy itself). 
(b) the  h i g h e r  level idea  of  that  affect of  joy itself (=  a 
consc iousness  of  that  joy,  which is i tself a consc iousness  of  
an af fec t ion  of  the  l)ody). 
(c) the  concep t  of  pass ing  f r o m  a lesser  to a g r e a t e r  
p e r f e c t i o n ,  etc. 
(d) the  concep t  of  s o m e t h i n g ' s  b e i n g  c o n d u c i v e  to a 
passage  f r o m  a lesser  to a g r e a t e r  p e r f e c t i o n ,  to the  
p r e s e r v a t i o n  of  one ' s  be ing ,  etc. 
H e r e  (d) is the  c o n c e p t  e q u a l e d  with the  c o n c e p t  of  the  
g o o d  in Sp inoza ' s  basic de f in i l ion  of  the  good ,  whi le  (b) is 
the  idea e q u a t e d  with K(;  in the  de r i va t i ve  e q u a t i o n  
asse r ted  in I)8, IV, but  (a) and  (c) will also r e p r e s e n l  K(;s  of  
s o m e  sort.  Now,  what we cou ld  m)t h a v e  if we w e r e  fully 
f ree  is a n y t h i n g  thai  p r e s u p p o s e s  o u r  actual ly h a v i n g  
i n a d e q u a t e  ideas o r  actual ly  pass ing  f r o m  a lesser  to a 
" See also his explanation <)f Def. III in Schol. P 59, III. 
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g r e a t e r  p e r f e c t i o n ,  etc., as b e c o m e s  c lea r  in P17, V, w h e r e  
Sp inoza  a r g u e s  that ,  s ince G o d  has only a d e q u a t e  ideas  a n d  
c a n n o t  pass e i t h e r  to a g r e a t e r  o r  to a lesser  p e r f e c t i o n ,  H e  
mus t  be f ree  f r o m  passions a n d  c a n n o t  be a f fec ted  with any 
affect  of  joy o r  so r row.  In fact, this is no t  t rue ,  if t h e r e  a re  
such th ings  as act ive  joys a n d  a d e q u a t  e k inds  of  KG (as we 
h a v e  seen,  a n d  will see again ,  Sp inoza  real ly be l ieves  t h e r e  
are,  bu t  t ends  to f o r g e t  about)  un less  the  h a v i n g  of  these  
p r e s u p p o s e s  the  actual ly h a v i n g  of  i n a d e q u a t e  ideas,  pas- 
sions, o r  passages  f r o m  a lesser  to a g r e a t e r  p e r f e c t i o n .  But  
this Sp inoza  n e v e r  shows and,  as was i n t i m a t e d  ear l ie r ,  may 
entai l  a m o r e  empi r i c i s t  view than  he  is r e ady  to e spouse .  
Does  Sp inoza  as a ra t ional is t  real ly want  to say that  G o d  
does  not  have  the  c o n c e p t s  inw>Ived in (c) a n d  (d)? Even  his 
say ing  that  G o d  can have  no  affects of  joy seems  to be 
incons i s t en t  with P35, V, in which S p i n o z a  says that  G o d  
de l igh t s  in His inf in i te  p e r f e c t i o n  a n d  h e n c e  loves H i m s e l f  
with an inf in i te  in te l lec tua l  love (which itself s eems  to 
c o n t r a d i c t  Co t .  P I7 ,  V). R e m e m b e r  that  love is joy 
a t t e n d e d  by the  idea  of  the  ob jec t  loved  as its cause.  But  if 
G o d  can know joy at all t hen  by P8 H e  mus t  h a v e  s o m e  
k ind  of  KG. In any case, we may s u p p o s e  that  H e  knows  
such th ings  as P28, IV, a n d  that  i g n o r a n c e  of  G o d  is evil, 
by e i t h e r  the  s e c o n d  or  the  th i rd  k ind  of  k n o w l e d g e ,  and ,  
hence ,  that  H e  wou ld  have  both  s o m e  KG a n d  s o m e  KE 
e v e ,  if he  knew no  joy. As far  as I can see, all this wou ld  
be t r u e  of  the  fully f ree  pe r son  as well,  if t h e r e  were  o n e  
(which Sp inoza  ca re fu l ly  po in ts  ou t  to be  c o n t r a r y  to ac tual  
or  e v e n  possible fact). 
H a v i n g  said this, it occurs  to me  tha t  S p i n o z a  may be 
t h i n k i n g  that  G o d  a n d  the  fully f r ee  p e r s o n  w o u l d  m a k e  no  
use of  any eva lua t ive  o r  n o r m a t i v e  d i scourse .  T h e i r  dis- 
c o u r s e  wou ld  be  wholly physical ,  psychologica l ,  m a t h e m a t i -  
cal, ep i s t emolog ica l ,  o r  me taphys ica l ,  a n d  they  wou ld  s imply  
act in ce r t a in  ways. T h i s  view is s o m e w h a t  s u g g e s t e d  by 
what  Sp inoza  says abou t  G o d  a n d  the  f r ee  o r  wise m a n  in 
IV a n d  V, e.g.,  in P17, V, a n d  e l s ewhe re .  It w o u l d  invo lve  
h o l d i n g ,  m u c h  as Kan t  does ,  that  eva lua t ive  a n d  n o r m a t i v e  
d i s cou r se  p r e s u p p o s e s  ttte p r e s e n c e  of  c o n t r a r y  passions,  
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i m p e r f e c t i o n s ,  etc., a n d  so wou ld  h a v e  no  use fo r  those  in 
w h o m  these  a re  not  p re sen t .  It also implies ,  h o w e v e r ,  that  
j u d g i n g  x to be g o o d  is not  s imply  the  same  t h i n g  as 
j u d g i n g  it to c o n t r i b u t e  to the  p r e s e r v a t i o n  of  one ' s  be ing ,  
as Sp inoza ' s  basic d e f i n i t i o n  seems  to say it is. Fo r  if these  
two j u d g m e n t s  a re  the  same,  t hen  t h e r e  is no  r ea son  why a 
f r ee  man  cou ld  not  m a k e  t h e m  both ,  a n d  also no  r ea son  
why  he  shou ld  not  use the  t e r m  " g o o d "  in m a k i n g  his 
j u d g m e n t ,  s ince he  cou ld  ha rd ly  be  p r o h i b i t e d  f r o m  h a v i n g  
two ways of  saying the  same  th ing ,  as Sp inoza  in effect  has 
of  asse r t ing  P28, IV.  A n o t h e r  way of  p u t t i n g  this  is to  say 
that  this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  Sp inoza  makes  h i m  s o m e t h i n g  
o t h e r  than  a p u r e  na tu ra l i s t  abou t  good .  But  to accep t  this 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  is to s u p p o s e  that  the  fully f ree  p e r s o n  wou ld  
not  know P28, IV, in the  f o r m  in which  Sp inoza  states it, 
s ince he  wou ld  k n o w  only that  a k n o w l e d g e  of  G o d  is 
c o n d u c i v e  to an inc rease  in one ' s  p e r f e c t i o n ,  a n d  e v e n  that ,  
in s o m e  sense,  he  wou ld  not  u n d e r s t a n d  any of  Sp inoza ' s  
talk abou t  g o o d  a n d  evil in Books  IV and  V. H e  w o u l d  
h a v e  g e n e r a l  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n d  a k n o w l e d g e  of  G o d ,  bu t  
he wou ld  not  know that  these  are  g o o d  or  that  the  o p p o s i t e  
states (which he  sure ly  can conce ive  of) wou ld  be bad.  
S u p p o s i n g  this does  not  s e e m  at all plausible ,  especial ly  if 
"x is g o o d "  m e a n s  "x is c o n d u c i v e  to p e r f e c t i o n , "  as S p i n o z a  
says it does.  
As fo r  lhe  ques t i on  which of  the  ideas listed in (a)-(d)  
above  the  fully f ree  m a n  wou ld  have  - -  Sp inoza  w o u l d  
a p p a r e n t l y  s a y  that  he  wou ld  have  n o n e  of  the  f o u r  k inds  
of  ideas,  but,  if I am  r ight ,  he  m i g h t  at least have  s o m e  of  
each  kind.  
V I I I  
In  par t ,  o u r  resul ts  may  be s u m m a r i z e d  by n o t i n g  that  
S p i n o z a  explici t ly o r  implic i t ly  r ecogn izes  severa l  d i f f e r e n t  
ways in which  KG (or  KGE?)  may be  d i v i d e d  in to  two 
kinds .  In the  o r d e r  of  the i r  a p p e a r a n c e  in o u r  d iscuss ion  
these  are :  
(a) the  d i s t inc t ion  b e t w e e n  the  KG that  = k n o w i n g  wha t  
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is c o n d u c i v e  to s e l f -p re se rva t ion  o r  p e r f e c t i o n  and  the  KG 
that  = h a v i n g  an affect of  joy a n d  be ing  consc ious  of  it; 
(b) the  dis t inct i (m b e t w e e n  the  la t te r  k ind  of  KG a n d  the  
k ind  of  KG that  s imply = h a v i n g  an affect of  joy [ these a re  
substant ia l ly  ident ica l  but  c o n c e p t u a l l y  dist inct] ;  
(c) the  d is t inc t ion  be tween  k n o w i n g  what  is d i rec t ly  o r  in 
itself g o o d  a n d  k n o w i n g  what  is ind i rec t ly  o r  ext r ins ica l ly  
g o o d ;  
(d) the  d i s t inc t ion  be tween  the  KG (and  KE, if I am  
r ight)  that  is a d e q u a t e  a n d  the  K G E  that  is i n a d e q u a t e ;  
(e) the  d is t inc t ion ,  u n d e r  each  of  the  k inds  in (b), 
be tween  the  KG that  = h a v i n g  a passive e m o t i o n  of  joy a n d  
b e i n g  consc ious  of  it a n d  that  which = h a v i n g  an act ive  
e m o t i o n  of  joy and  be ing  consc ious  of  it [this d i s t inc t ion  
may co inc ide  with that in (c)]; 
(f) the  d is t inc t ion  be tween  the  KG that  is pa r t i cu la r ,  i.e. 
k n o w l e d g e  that  a cer ta in  t h ing  is good ,  and  the  KG that  is 
g e n e r a l ;  
(g) the  d is t inc t ion  be tween  the  K( ;  t h a t -  a consc iousness  
<>f excess ive  joy and  K(;  of  the  k ind  inw)lved  in c h e e r f u l -  
hess [This  d is t inc t ion  may co inc ide  with that  in (e)]. '~ 
Besides  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  these,  in most cases m o r e  expl ici t ly  
t han  Sp inoza  does,  1 have  a r g u e d  that  they canno t  all be 
e q u a t e d  with h a v i n g  an affect of  joy and  b e i n g  consc ious  of  
it, or ,  in o t h e r  words ,  that s o m e  of  t h e m  are  not  only 
concep tua l ly  but  also m o r e  substant ia l ly  dis t inct .  In par t icu-  
lar, I th ink  this is t rue  of  the  first k inds  m e n t i o n e d  in (a) 
a n d  (d) and  the  second  k inds  m e n t i o n e d  in (c), (d), a n d  (f). 
In shor t ,  the  e q u a t i o n  asse r ted  in I'8, IV, is not the  whole  
t ru th .  It also is not  Sp inoza ' s  most  basic e q u a t i o n  invo lv ing  
KGE,  but a de r i va t i ve  one.  T h e  basic e( lua t ion  is that  KGE 
= k n o w i n g  what is and  what is not  c o n d u c i v e  [in the  b r o a d  
sense  i nd i ca t ed  in (I)  in Sect ion  IV ahove]  to self- 
p e r f e c t i o n ,  etc.,  which holds  for  all the  k inds  of  KGE 
d i s t i ngu i shed .  T h e  main  po in t  left o f  P8 is the  asser t ion  
" Perhaps one should add (h) lhe distinction between the K(; that = 
judging or calling a thing good and the KG that = knowing that a thing 
is good. 
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that  every  affect  of  joy and  s o r r o w  a n d  every  idea of  such  
an affect  is a k ind  o f  K G E  as d e f i n e d  by Sp inoza ' s  basic 
e q u a t i o n  and  always c o n t a i n s ~ s o m e  t ru th ,  even  w h e n  it is 
par t ly  mis taken ,  as it s o m e t i m e s  is. T h i s  po in t  by i tself  
separa tes  Sp inoza  f r o m  the  h e d o n i s t  a n d  the emot iv is t ,  but  
this is d o n e  even  m o r e  by the  fact that  Sp inoza  really holds ,  
t h o u g h  he  seems  not  to, thai  t h e r e  a re  k inds  of  K G E  which  
a re  not  r educ ib l e  to con,sciousnesses o r  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  joy  
and  sor row.  As B r o a d  puts  it:, p l ea su re  (joy) is fo r  Sp inoza  
not  the  ratio essendi of the  good ,  as it is for  the  hedon i s t ,  
and  in a way for  the  emot iv is t ,  bu t  the  ratio cognoscendi?~ 
T h e  ratio essendi of  the  g o o d  is c o n d u c i v e n e s s  to self- 
p e r f e c t i o n ,  i.e. to k n o w l e d g e  and  u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  
Fo r  the  rest, we may s u m m a r i z e  by r e f e r r i n g  to the  t h r e e  
p r o b l e m s  abou t  Sp inoza ' s  me ta -e th ic s  listed in the  i n t r o d u c -  
tion. A b o u t  the  th i rd  I have  said wha t  I have  to say in (2) 
a n d  (4) in Sect ion IV and  (6) in Sect ion  V; we saw that 
t he r e  is a consis lent  posi t ion b e h i n d  the  a p p a r e n t l y  confl ic t -  
ing  th ings  Spim)za says in the  r e l evan l  passages,  but  that ,  to 
hold  it, he  mus t  mod i fy  his c la im aboui  l he  pr ior i ty  o f  
d e s i r i n g  x to j u d g i n g  it good .  
T h e  second  p r o b l e m ,  a h e a d y  t o u c h e d  on in this 
s u m m a r y ,  was deal t  with in Sect ion I l l  and  u n d e r  (I) in IV. 
In spi te  of  o n e  a p p a r e n l  def in i t ion  that  seems  to do  so, 
Sp inoza  does  not m a k e  h e d o n i s m  I rue  hy def in i t ion ,  his 
basic r be ing  non -hedon i s t i c .  H e  does  no~ l ) roceed  
f r o m  a hedon i s t i c  de t in i t ion  phts ax ioms  and  p r e v i o u s  
t h e o r e m s .  It is t r u e  thai he  cou ld  take his n o n - h e d o n i s t i c  
de f in i t i on  of  g o o d  as basic and  yet e q u a t e  p l ea su re  (joy) 
and  the  g o o d  at a second  or  th i rd  r e m o v e ,  as he  seems  
implici t ly to do  in 1"8;. Really, h o w e v e r ,  even  at s econd  o r  
th i rd  r e m o v e ,  he  equa t e s  the  good ,  not  with p leasure ,  bu l  
with k~aow|edge o r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  H e  ag rees  with the  
h e d o n i s t  that: K( ;  = k n o w l e d g e  of  p l ea su re  a n d  of  what  is 
c o n d u c i v e  to p leasure ,  but  for  h im this does  not  m e a n  that  
the  g o o d  = p leasure ;  it m e a n s  only that  all consc iousness  of  
joy is a cogn i t i on  of  g o o d  and  thai all cogn i t i on  of  g o o d  is a 
"~ Op.  eit., p. 52. 
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consc iousness  of joy - -  a n d  we have  f o u n d  that  he  c a n n o t  
really sus ta in  the  la t ter  of these  two claims. 
As for  the  first p r o b l e m  - -  we have seen that  PS, IV, 
does no t  c o m m i t  Sp inoza  to emot iv i sm.  For  h i m  P8 is just  a 
der iva t ive  e q u a t i o n  that  looks like s o m e t h i n g  an  emot iv is t  
would  say b u t  is not ,  for  b e h i n d  it is the  view that  an  affect 
is a k ind  of cogn i t ion ,  c o n f u s e d  or  not ,  of a state of the  
body.  It is t r ue  that  Sp inoza  says empha t i ca l ly  that  we 
j u d g e  a t h ing  good  because  we des i re  it, no t  vice versa. B u t  
(a) this asser t ion  mus t  be qual i f ied ,  s ince he also m a i n t a i n s  
the  reverse,  a n d  (b) this d i c t u m  is c o m p a t i b l e  with his b e i n g  
a na tura l i s t .  G iven  his view that  a p e r s o n  essent ial ly is  a 
c o n a t u s  ( endeavor )  for  pe r fec t ion ,  Sp inoza  cou ld  ho ld  e i the r  
that  a va lue  j u d g m e n t  is an  exp re s s ion  of this c o n a t u s  on its 
f i nd ing  that  s o m e t h i n g  is c o n d u c i v e  to pe r f ec t i on  or  that  it 
is s imply an  asser t ion  t o  this c o n a t u s  that  s o m e t h i n g  is 
conduc ive  to per fec t ion .  In  my p rev ious  p a p e r  I sugges ted  
that  a Spinozis t  migh t  choose the  first a l t e rna t ive  a n d  be an  
emotivis t ,  bu t  Sp inoza  h imse l f  chose the la t ter  a n d  so is a 
na tura l i s t .  He  does somet imes ,  however ,  say t h ings  that  are,  
verbal ly at least, compa t ib l e  with e i the r  a l te rna t ive .  H e  also 
allows, as we saw in (5) of Sect ion V, that  a piece of KG has 
a affective qual i ty  a n d  is no t  jus t  t r u e  (or false), bu t ,  if I am 
r ight  in what  I said at the  e n d  of (8), this may m e a n  only 
that  a k n o w l e d g e  of s o m e t h i n g ' s  be ing  c o n d u c i v e  to one ' s  
pe r f ec t inn  is a c c o m p a n i e d  by joy. 
We also saw in (11), Sect ion VI I ,  that  G o d  a n d  the fully 
free p e r s o n  are,  on Sp inoza ' s  own premises ,  no t  so 
axiologically b l i nd  as he r e p r e s e n t s  t h e m  as be ing .  But,  like 
o u r  o the r  f ind ings ,  this only  shows that  all good  th ings  are  
as difficult  as they are  rare.  
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